

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS**

Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-9

**JOE BLESSETT
PLAINTIFF**

United States Courts
Southern District of Texas
FILED

JAN 07 2022

VS.

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk of Court

TEXAS

GREGG ABBOTT

KEN PAXTON,

**TEXAS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,**

STEVEN C MCCRAW,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

XAVIER BECERRA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AND HUMAN SERVICES

ANTHONY BLINKIN

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES

CITY OF GALVESTON

SINKIN LAW FIRM

DEFENDANTS

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DEFENDANTS

Complaint and Injunction for Declaratory Judgment

1 Joe Blessett (Blessett), an individual of maturity managing the affairs of JOSEPH C
2 BLESSETT and presents this certified document and complaint with an injunction for
3 declaratory judgment. Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal, Notice to Principal is Notice
4 to Agent, Applications to all successors assigns. The contents of this legal instrument are
5 present under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) exclusion from hearsay. Texas
6 Notary Certified Affidavit under **28 U.S. Code § 1746** and **28 U.S. Code § 1734** in this
7 civil Complaint to prefect the Prima Facia case.

8 The Defendants are in dishonor as per UCC-3.505(b) in their failure to present
9 instruments with a valid signature for the debt. Plaintiff issued a certified documented
10 protest as per UCC 3-303 to be used to setoff and discharge the balance of the alleged
11 Texas Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division debt against JOSEPH
12 CRAIG BLESSETT. The principle of equity requires the accused to produce a legal
13 instrument with contractual stipulations for equity to correct a defect in equity.

14 The defendants have infringed on and deprived Plaintiff's rights to enforce this invalid
15 debt. Accordingly, we ask this court to review the negligence in law¹ of the accused as it
16 applies to legal procedures and public law restrictions on government, along with federal,
17 state, and private actors.

Cause of Actions

18
19 Cause of action under contract law, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 5, U.C.C. 1-103, UCC-3.505,
20 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, 28 U.S.C. § 2401, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18
21 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiff is protesting at law and

¹ Negligence in law. Failure to observe a duty imposed by law. **Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edition**

22 in equity under the definition of Part A Sec. 1101(d)², equitable estoppel³, respondeat
23 superior⁴, U.S. Supremacy Clause Article VI, Clause 2, discrimination against child
24 support debtors interstate contracts and infringement on rights and privileges. Plaintiff will
25 address noncompliance of Title IV-D contracted actors, agency, and U.S. executive agency
26 failures. Plaintiff seeks execution of legal notices and a remedy for injuries under Title IV-
27 D an Act of U.S. Congress. The Defendants claim that JOSEPH C BLESSETT has a
28 financial obligation to the state agency without proof of that obligation. The Defendants
29 had an obligation under uniform commerce laws of equity to provide evidence of debt to
30 Texas or Social Security Administration. Plaintiff evidence is admitted to establishing the
31 accusation's truth. The Defendant's silence indicates the accused's "consciousness of
32 guilt."⁵ The Defendants had a duty to ensure Blessett equal immunities, equal protection of
33 laws, and public privileges as written in state law, federal law, and the U.S. Constitution
34 as public servants.

² Part A Sec.1101(d) [42 U.S.C. 1301] Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing any Federal official, agent, or representative, in carrying out any of the provisions of this Act, to take charge of any child over the objection of either of the parents of such child, or of the person standing in loco parentis to such child.

³ Equitable estoppel, sometimes known as estoppel in pais, protects one party from being harmed by another party's voluntary conduct. Voluntary conduct may be an action, silence, Acquiescence, or concealment of material facts. One example of equitable estoppel due to a party's acquiescence is found in **Lambertini v. Lambertini, 655 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)**. In the late 1950s, Olga, who was married to another man, and Frank Lambertini met and began living together in Argentina. Olga and Frank hired an attorney in Buenos Aires, who purported to Divorce Olga from her first husband and marry her to Frank pursuant to Mexican law. The Lambertinis began what they thought was a married life together, and soon produced two children. In 1968, they moved to the United States and became Florida residents.

⁴ Respondeat superior is "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of employment or agency." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

⁵ The silence indicates the "consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused by allowing an imputation opposed to the presumption of innocence to pass unchallenged." People v. Yeager, supra note 2, at 486, 229 Pac. at 54. People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 485-86, 229 Pac. 40, 54 (1924)

35 Plaintiff states for this U.S. District Court under penalty of perjury as the firsthand
36 witness⁶ to action and activities that the artificial entity JOSEPH C BLESSETT is clear of
37 any *NONDISCHARGEABILITY*⁷ debts owed under State law to a State. Plaintiff submits this
38 certified legal instrument to set off all alleged debts claims as of January 9, 2022, by Texas
39 or any of its agencies against JOSEPH C BLESSETT. Nothing was given to JOSEPH C.
40 BLESSETT from Texas or the state agencies, and nothing shall be returned. Therefore, as
41 it is written, Joe Blessett retains his right to equal protection under the law, from state
42 government infringement and the right to enjoy his Final Divorce Decree contract.

43 Joe Blessett reserves and claims his rights as the creditor without prejudice under
44 U.C.C. 1-308. Blessett demands under U.C.C. 1-103 that parties asserting a debt claim
45 enter a counterclaim as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 13, producing the legal
46 instrument before this court following the federal statutes of Title IV-D of the Social
47 Security Act and laws of equity. Blessett reserve his claim to uniform commerce under the
48 Uniform Commercial Code, Commerce Clause Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S.
49 Constitution, and Contract Clause Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution
50 protections for individuals engaged in intrastate and interstate commerce. Blessett's
51 complaint establishes the state government's deprivation and infringement restrictions
52 through common law, federal law, and the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff demands the **Texas**
53 **Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division** present for reviewing
54 the recorded or retained legal instrument⁸ of JOSEPH C BLESSETT financial obligation

⁶ Fed.Rule of Evidence 602. Need for Personal Knowledge. A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness's own testimony.

⁷ 42 U.S. Code § 653a (b) Nondischargeability

A debt (as defined in section 101 of title 11) owed under State law to a State (as defined in such section) or municipality (as defined in such section) that is in the nature of support and that is enforceable under this part is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under title 11.

⁸ 15 U.S.C. § 7001(e) Accuracy and ability to retain contracts and other records

Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that a contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be in writing, the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of an electronic record of such contract or other record

55 to the Title IV-D agency or Texas. Plaintiff demands the **Texas Department of Public**
56 **Safety** present for reviewing the judicial order for JOSEPH C BLESSETT’S September
57 22, 2014, driver license suspension and evidence of an injured party. The Defendants are
58 dishonor as per Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-3.305(b)⁹ in their failure to respond to
59 the Notice of Acceptance and Notice of Nonresponse.

60 Suppose the TEXAS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CHILD SUPPORT
61 ENFORCEMENT DIVISION cannot or declines to validate the alleged state debt owed by
62 JOSEPH C BLESSETT. In that case, the debt is declared paid in full upon dismissal or
63 adjudication of this federal complaint.

64 **State of Texas** presence has been requested under federal statute 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201
65 and 2202 to enjoin named state actors, Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support
66 Enforcement Division, Texas Department of Public Safety, and the CITY OF
67 GALVESTON. Additionally, Plaintiff challenges Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 and
68 Sec.232.0022 *Suspension or Nonrenewal of Motor Vehicle Registration* is pursuant to 28
69 U.S.C. § 2403 as discriminatory debt collection enforcement repugnant to the U.S.
70 Constitution unlawfully attachment to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act enforcement.
71 The Texas Codes only attack one specific type of interstate contract, establishing inequity
72 at law and in equity for a specific group. Blessett charges for the unlawful application of
73 Title IV-D enforcement that caused injuries.

74 Blessett seeks a Declaratory Judgment to declare the codes unconstitutional and seek
75 Injunctive Relief, Estoppel of Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 and Sec.232.0022 pending
76 a judicial decision. Additionally, Blessett requests for his injuries that Texas be barred from

may be denied if such electronic record is not in a form that is capable of being retained and accurately reproduced for later reference by all parties or persons who are entitled to retain the contract or other record.

⁹ § 3-305. DEFENSES AND CLAIMS IN RECOUPMENT. (b) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection (a)(1) but is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3) against a person other than the holder.
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/3/3-305> (Legal Information Institute)

77 participating in the 42 U.S.C. 658a incentives for performance of the Title IV-D program
78 for (7) seven years.

79 **Gregg Abbott** is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C. §§
80 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for not stopping deprivation and infringement of
81 Blessett's rights under the application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act federal
82 revenue¹⁰ collection program for Title IV-A of the Act after receiving notice from Joe
83 Blessett. *Gregg Abbott has or should have tacit, explicit, and implicit knowledge*¹¹ of the
84 Title IV-D spending clause requirements. Blessett seeks payment for the agreed terms of
85 the Notice of Acceptance and Notice of Nonresponse. Plaintiff requests the court grant an
86 order as agreed; Gregg Abbott delivers one hundred thousand dollars \$100,000.00 per day
87 charge to be paid to Joseph Blessett for each day after June 9, 2021, receipt of the Notice
88 of Nonresponse and Notice of Acceptance.

89 **Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division's** presence
90 has been requested to be enjoined under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 245,
91 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 for the unlawful Denial of U.S.
92 Passport in 2005 and Driver License Suspension in 2014 without Blessett consent to the
93 program or modification of the original support order. The Texas Title IV-D agency lacks
94 the legal capacity to enforce the Title IV-D provisions against JOSEPH C BLESSETT.
95 Law requires Defendant to offer counterclaim as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 13

¹⁰ 28 U.S. Code § 1357. Injuries under Federal laws The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by any person to recover damages for any injury to his person or property on account of any act done by him, under any Act of Congress, for the protection or collection of any of the revenues, or to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in any State. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1357>

¹¹ 42 U.S.C. § 602 - Eligible States; State plan. (6) Certification of standards and procedures to ensure against program fraud and abuse. A certification by the chief executive officer of the State that the State has established and is enforcing standards and procedures to ensure against program fraud and abuse, including standards and procedures concerning nepotism, conflicts of interest among individuals responsible for the administration and supervision of the State program, kickbacks, and the use of political patronage. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/602#\(Legal Information Institute\)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/602#(Legal%20Information%20Institute))

96 producing the legal instrument before this court as evidence of the Plaintiff informed
97 consent to a Title IV-D contract.

98 Blessett seeks a Declaratory Judgment to have the unlawful Title IV-D administrative
99 orders for Denial of U.S. Passport in 2005 and Driver License Suspension in 2014
100 overturned with the privileges restored to JOSEPH C BLESSETT.

101 **Ken Paxton** is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C. §§
102 241, 242 and 245, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for not stopping deprivation and infringement of
103 Blessett's rights under the application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act federal
104 revenue collection program for Title IV-A of the Act after receiving notice from Joe
105 Blessett. Ken Paxton has or should have tacit, explicit, and implicit knowledge of the Title
106 IV-D spending clause requirements.

107 Blessett seeks payment for the agreed terms of the Notice of Nonresponse. Accordingly,
108 the Plaintiff requests the court grant an order as agreed, and Ken Paxton deliver one
109 hundred thousand dollars \$100,000.00 per day charge to be paid to Joseph Blessett for
110 each day after June 9, 2021, receipt of the presentment Notice of Nonresponse and Notice
111 of Acceptance.

112 **Texas Department of Public Safety** presence has been requested to be enjoined under
113 28 U.S.C. §1357, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 to remove an unlawful
114 executive order for Texas driver license suspension. As a remedy, Blessett seeks a
115 Declaratory Judgment with injunctive relief to have Texas driver license privileges restored
116 to JOSEPH C BLESSETT.

117 **Steven C McCall** is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18
118 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for not stopping deprivation and infringement
119 of Blessett's rights under the application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act federal
120 revenue collection program for Title IV-A of the Act after receiving notice from Joe
121 Blessett. Steven C McCall has or should have tacit, explicit, and implicit knowledge of the
122 procedural law for child support suspension of Texas driver license requirements. Blessett

123 seeks payment for the agreed terms of the Notice of Nonresponse and Notice of
124 Acceptance.

125 **City Of Galveston's** presence has been requested under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

126 Blessett charges the City of Galveston administrative customs¹² and policies,
127 disregarding civil procedures and omitting civil procedures before judicial hearings under
128 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C. §242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

129 Ex-agents of the City of Galveston Barbara Roberts and Evelyn Wells Robison have
130 been named to be summoned if necessary in this civil action for infringement on the
131 Plaintiff's civil rights. Blessett contacted Norman B. Franzke requesting a copy of the legal
132 instruments showing the loss or surrender of MARIA L. BLESSETT and JOSEPH C.
133 BLESSETT Texas homestead exemption privilege for the property located at 2515
134 Merrimac, League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing before June
135 30, 2017. As a matter of custom and policy, we charge the Galveston County Court and
136 Court Clerk with accepting Title IV-D administrative orders without the consent of the
137 affected party or a judicial order and conducting judicial hearing orders without any
138 evidence of proof of services against the Plaintiff. Therefore, there is no *evidence of proper*
139 *notice complying with Texas Rules of Civil Procedures*¹³ *of a hearing before hearing*
140 *Galveston County Family Court for a default judgment or hearing* on a protected Texas-
141 exempt homestead. There is no evidence of the legal instruments showing the loss or
142 surrender or a levy on MARIA L. BLESSETT and JOSEPH C. BLESSETT Texas
143 homestead exemption privilege for the property located at 2515 Merrimac, League City,
144 Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing before June 30, 2017.

¹² Fed.Rule of Evidence 406. Evidence of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice. The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.

¹³ Fed.Rule of Evidence 302. Applying State Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases. In a civil case, state law governs the effect of a presumption regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.

145 As a remedy, Blessett seeks a Declaratory Judgment requesting a full-page
146 advertisement apology taken out in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and USA
147 Today in big block letters. THE CITY OF GALVESTON, LOCATED ON THE
148 BEAUTIFUL GULF COAST OF TEXAS, APOLOGIZES FOR THE INCONVENIENCE
149 WE CAUSED JOE BLESSETT or bar the CITY OF GALVESTON from participating in
150 the Title IV-D program for (10) ten years.

151 **United States** presence has been requested to be enjoined under 28 U.S. Code §
152 1346(b), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 to defend Xavier Becerra, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
153 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Anthony
154 Blinkin and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. In addition, Blessett questions the
155 Constitutionality of the application of Title IV-D informed consent procedures, unfair or
156 deceptive acts or practices as unfair methods of competition affecting commerce, the
157 incentives for performance 42 U.S.C. 658a, the lack of benefits to the nonprimary parent,
158 lack of legal protections nonprimary parent against state agency abuses, Non-Title IV-A
159 employee wage withholding garnishments, gender discrimination by imposing religious
160 morality standards against biological heterosexual males instead of law and the lack of
161 oversight of U.S. government oversight on the contracted state agencies child support
162 collection and enforcement abuses. Finally, we charge that Title IV-D of the Social
163 Security Act debt collection operates as a monopoly in violation of the **Sherman Act**. Title
164 IV-D of the Social Security Act incentivizes state actors to find ways to modify state court
165 support orders or private agreements. It is a clear advantage over private contracts. In this
166 civil action, the Texas agency infringed on the Plaintiff's contract, ignoring its existence.
167 The State agencies offer inexpensive consolidated collection and enforcement services in
168 exchange for reassignment or creation of the custodial parents payable accounts with
169 deceptive practices to get the noncustodial parents cooperation.

170 Blessett seeks a Declaratory Judgment, as a remedy requests: (a) the U.S Government
171 present for the court the benefits in the Title IV-D program contract for the noncustodial
172 parent. In addition, (b)Blessett requests the U.S. Government present for the court how the

173 Texas Agency bill and get paid for illegal service against Blessett and not be a fraud against
174 the U.S. Government. (c) Blessett requests the U.S Government present the Title IV-D
175 program written contractual instrument for the court for informed consent given to the
176 noncustodial parent. (d) Blessett asks the U.S Government show the protected right in the
177 U.S. Constitution amendment for illegitimate children the right to their father's income or
178 property without a contract. (f) Determination of Title IV-D program as a Business-to-
179 business private enterprise for profit under Cooperate Federalism. (g) Plaintiff requests a
180 permanent injunction against Title IV-D enforcement penalties listed in 42 U.S.C. 654,
181 U.S.C. 652(k), and all the provisions listed under federal statute 42 U.S.C. 666 to remain
182 in place until U.S. Congress correct the deficiencies in the Act listed in this civil suit.

183 Blessett requests an injunction stopping all Title IV-D program enforcement until the
184 U.S. Congress can write legislation to correct the defects in the program, such as; (a)
185 inadequate legal protections and benefits for the noncustodial parents in the application of
186 the Title IV-D programs. (b) inadequate protection of U.S. Government interest for monies
187 spent on state agency's Title IV-D administrative reimbursements. (c) specific legislation
188 to address deceptive practices (d) specific legislation addressing the Separation of Powers
189 for state and federal body's performance of the program and Supremacy Cause issues.

190 **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES** presence has been
191 requested to be enjoined under 28 U.S. Code § 1346(b), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, and 2202.
192 For its negligence and incompetence in the custodianship of Title IV-D of the Social
193 Security Act. In addition, Blessett seeks a judicial review of the executive agency's Office
194 of Child Support Enforcement under 5 U.S. Code § 702 for lack of remedy in courts for
195 the agency's inaction and 5 U.S. Code § 705 relief pending review of the U.S. Department
196 of Health and Human Services. Plaintiff demands the **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF**
197 **HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES** present for reviewing the recorded or retained
198 legal instrument of JOSEPH C BLESSETT financial obligation to the Title IV-D agency
199 or Texas. Finally, Blessett requests that the agency decertifies the child support debt against
200 JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT. Blessett seeks Injunctive Relief, Equitable Estoppel of

201 Administrative Enforcement penalties pending a judicial decision. Blessett challenges the
202 application and oversight of the Title IV-D program for Due Process issues involving
203 noncustodial parent enrollment and enforcement of the program. This civil action asserts
204 procedural civil law and substantive law omissions by the Defendants. As a remedy,
205 Blessett requests to be paid three times the lost maritime wages (\$4,800,000.00) four
206 million eight hundred thousand dollars.

207 **Xavier Becerra** is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C.
208 §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligence in his duties as the Secretary and
209 deprivation of Blessett’s rights under the application of Title IV-D of the Social Security
210 Act federal revenue collection¹⁴ program for Title IV-A of the Act. Xavier Becerra is
211 negligent in his duties, failing as the Secretary to maintain proper oversight for checks and
212 balances on the Office of Child Support enforcement and contracted state agencies
213 application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. In addition, Xavier Becerra has or
214 should have tacit, explicit, and implicit knowledge of the Title IV-D spending clause
215 requirements and uniform commerce clause protections for natural persons. As a remedy,
216 Blessett requests to be paid three times the lost maritime wages (\$4,800,000.00) four
217 million eight hundred thousand dollars.

218 **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE** presence has been requested under 28 U.S.C. §
219 2679(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, and 2202. Plaintiff demands the **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF**
220 **STATE** present for reviewing the recorded or retained legal instrument of JOSEPH C
221 BLESSETT to enforce the financial obligation under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.
222 The enforcement of Title IV-D destroyed Plaintiff’s maritime career.

¹⁴ 28 U.S. Code § 1357. Injuries under Federal laws The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by any person to recover damages for any injury to his person or property on account of any act done by him, under any Act of Congress, for the protection or collection of any of the revenues, or to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in any State. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1357>

223 As a remedy, Blessett seeks a Declaratory Judgment to have U.S. Passport Privileges
224 restored to JOSEPH C BLESSETT.

225 **Anthony Blinkin** is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18
226 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for not stopping deprivation and
227 infringement of Blessett's rights under the application of Title IV-D of the Social Security
228 Act federal revenue collection program for Title IV-A of the Act after receiving notice
229 from Joe Blessett. Anthony Blinkin has or should have tacit, explicit, and implicit
230 knowledge of the Title IV-D spending clause requirements. Accordingly, Blessett seeks
231 payment for the agreed terms of the Notice of Nonresponse and Notice of Acceptance.

232 **Sinkin Law Firm**

233 Sinkin Law Firm is charged under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242,
234 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985. Sinkin Law Firm took control of property through
235 legal maneuvers under the color of law and *Never Compensated* JOSEPH C BLESSETT
236 for the property. The lack of financial instruments¹⁵ under U.C.C. § 3-304 (3) creates a
237 defect in equity as if credits and debts were never secured by anything of value. It is value
238 and consideration for the transfer of things of value. Plaintiff has lost something of value
239 without compensation.

240 On May 12, 2017, the Sinkin Law Firm agent lied to place an unlawful encumbrance
241 on the Plaintiff's property. On Sinkin Law Firm attorney lied again to U.S. Federal District
242 Court to cover the first lie. Sinkin Law Firm placed an encumbrance on the property, took
243 control, and purchased the property well below market value.

244 As remedy Blessett request (\$1,000,000.00) one million dollars for the inconveniences
245 caused by Sinkin Law Firm actions or full-page advertisement in bold letters in San

¹⁵ U.C.C. § 3-304. OVERDUE INSTRUMENT (3) if the instrument is not a check, when the instrument has been outstanding for a period of time after its date which is unreasonably long under the circumstances of the particular case in light of the nature of the instrument and usage of the trade.

246 Antonio Express-News, San Antonio Post, and Los Angeles Times apologizing stating
247 Sinkin Law Firm apologizes to Joe Blessett for the inconveniences, we caused, along with
248 (\$300, 000.00) three hundred thousand dollars paid to the Plaintiff.

249

250

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 251 1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
252 2. This court has subject matter jurisdiction for the United States 5 U.S.C. § 702 judicial
253 review of the 5 U.S.C. § 101 agency oversight policies in the enforcement of spending
254 clause penalties, and the agency’s active prevention of its contractors’ violation of
255 noncustodial parents protected rights, and child support debtor protected rights
256 3. The Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory
257 Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
258 4. U.S. Constitutional Challenge to Statutes and Congressional Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
259 § 2403
260 5. The venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and 1391(e).
261 6. Plaintiff brings this suit under 15 U.S. Code § 1 for contracts and reserves the right to
262 call additional parties under 15 U.S.C. § 5.
263 7. Plaintiff brings this suit under 28 U.S. Code § 1357 for any injuries done under an Act
264 of Congress to protect and collect Title IV revenues of the Social Security Act.
265 8. Plaintiff takes civil action against the private individuals, state, and federal actors
266 named in this suit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983.
267 9. Plaintiff seeks his lost maritime wages as a remedy under 28 U.S. Code § 1346(b) for
268 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services negligent enforcement and
269 omission of spending clause enforcements on the Texas Title IV-D agency.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Blessett does not have contract with the OAG for child support collection service and any enforcement obligation under the Title IV-D program. Blessett demands the OAG show material evidence of Blessett’s informed consent or a valid judicial state court order to the contractual terms of the Title IV-D program. Blessett contract states on page 31 item #15 of the July 23, 1999, Final Divorce Decree: **Relief Not Granted. IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED** that all relief in this case not expressly granted is denied. The **CITY OF GALVESTON, District** Clerk Office Evelyn Wells Robison changed the name of the payee without the Plaintiff’s permission, judicial order without notice to Blessett to legally defend his contract in a court of law. There is no evidence of court order modification of the July 23, 1999, support order or a court order for the failed enforcement of the contractual penalties listed in the Final Divorce Decree. At 2:18 pm on October 22, 1999, Cynthia Brown-Sayko, and Assistant Attorney General of the Child Support Division Texas Bar No. 00793042 entered a “Notice of Change of Payee” for the Galveston County District Clerk’s Office, Evelyn Wells Robison, 722 Moody, 4th Floor, Galveston Texas 77550 to file a change of payee to the Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 13499, Austin Texas 78711. The change of payee is an administrative action without a judicial modification to the primary lender’s original support order or consent. It was done by a City of Galveston representative and an OAG agent in 1999. It is a fact that on July 13, 2015, Galveston County Family Court #2 awarded the OAG a default judgment without following Texas Rules of Civil Procedures return of service Rule 107(h) before the hearing. It is the fact that Galveston County Family Court #2 awarded the transfer of a Texas homestead exempted protected property without Texas Rules of Civil Procedures return of service Rule 107(h) before the hearing. These patterns and customs directly affect the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s explicit pre-emptive language. Under the U.S. Constitution, Plaintiff is not obligated to honor any judgments in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 1983. Under Texas Local Government Code Title 3 Sec. 87.012, the CITY OF

332 GALVESTON had an obligation to remove a judge that does not respect the law¹⁶.
333 Plaintiff submitted a petition¹⁷ as per Texas Local Government Code Title 3 Sec. 87.015
334 asking Judge Barbara Roberts to uphold the U.S. Constitution.

335 The Texas Title IV-D program claimed JOSEPH C BLESSETT owed a debt¹⁸, and by
336 law, to protect uniform commerce, the agency must show proof of JOSEPH C BLESSETT
337 obligation to the state. Joe Blessett is the holder in due course, the primary lender of the
338 monies loaned to JOSEPH C BLESSETT and, as the primary creditor, set the loan terms.
339 Texas nor its Title IV-D agency has presented to Blessett with a legal instrument for a
340 monetary loan of monies to JOSEPH C BLESSETT. Plaintiff's lost privileges in 2005
341 under Denial of Passport under 42 U.S.C. 652(k) Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and
342 again in 2014 under 42 U.S.C. 666(16) Title IV-D license suspension. Enforcement action
343 to REVOKED DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT with a September 22, 2014, and end

¹⁶ Sec. 87.011. DEFINITIONS. In this subchapter: (1)"District attorney" includes a criminal district attorney. (2) "Incompetency" means: (A) gross ignorance of official duties; (B) gross carelessness in the discharge of those duties; or (C) unfitness or inability to promptly and properly discharge official duties because of a serious physical or mental defect that did not exist at the time of the officer's election. (3) "Official misconduct" means intentional, unlawful behavior relating to official duties by an officer entrusted with the administration of justice or the execution of the law. The term includes an intentional or corrupt failure, refusal, or neglect of an officer to perform a duty imposed on the officer by law. <https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/LG/pdf/LG.87.pdf>

¹⁷ Sec. 87.015. PETITION FOR REMOVAL(c) The petition must be addressed to the district judge of the court in which it is filed. The petition must set forth the grounds alleged for the removal of the officer in plain and intelligible language and must cite the time and place of the occurrence of each act alleged as a ground for removal with as much certainty as the nature of the case permits. <https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/LG/pdf/LG.87.pdf>

¹⁸ To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show "an injury-in-fact caused by a defendant's challenged conduct that is redressable by a court." *K.P. v. LeBlanc*, 627 F.3d 115, 122 (5th Cir. 2010). For a plaintiff's claim to be redressable, it must be "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the plaintiff's injury." ***S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La.*, 252 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir.2001)**. "[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury." ***LeBlanc*, 627 F.3d at 123 (alteration in original) (quoting *Larson v. Valente*, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982))**, **DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS v. Texas Lottery Com'n**, 727 F. 3d 415 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 2013, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3919177222792525866&q=Thompson+v.Smith,+154+SE+579&hl=en&as_sdt=4,60 (Google Scholar)

344 date December 31, 9999. Blessett has lost a least (\$100,000.00) one hundred thousand
345 dollars a year in maritime income since 2005, an injury in fact, which would total
346 (\$1,600,000.00) one million six hundred thousand dollars under modest calculation for the
347 opportunities lost wages to date as of 2021. The OAG ignored *Article, I, Section 10, Clause*
348 *1 of the United States Constitution, known as the Contract Clause, which imposes certain*
349 *prohibitions on the states. These prohibitions are meant to protect individuals from*
350 *intrusion by state governments. The 10th Amendment states a truism that all is retained*
351 *which has not been surrendered.* If consent was not given, Texas may not exercise
352 authority over JOSEPH C BLESSETT; if given, they might exercise it, although it should
353 interfere with the laws or even the Texas or U.S. Constitutions.

354 As an **Executive Maritime Engineering Officer with a U.S. Maritime License**,
355 Blessett received income as maritime wages from multiple states. Child support collection
356 and enforcement required the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support
357 Enforcement Division (OAG) to act under their federal contract. It was illegal to withhold
358 Blessett's maritime wages under 46 U.S.C. § 11109¹⁹ as an illegal attachment of wages
359 without a valid judicial order. Title IV-D administrative orders are unlawful without the
360 validation of judicial order or the evidence of informed consent to Title IV-D collection
361 and enforcement. The OAG presented an executive order for wage withholding under an
362 invalid contract. It is the illegal application of an act of the U.S. Congress to intercept or
363 withhold monies under the color of law. Therefore, it is theft under the color of law from
364 Plaintiff and the theft of U.S. Government monies paid for the collection and enforcement

¹⁹ 46 U.S.C, § 11109 (a)Wages due or accruing to a master or seaman are not subject to attachment or arrestment from any court, except for an order of a court about the payment by a master or seaman of any part of the master's or seaman's wages for the support and maintenance of the spouse or minor children of the master or seaman, or both. A payment of wages to a master or seaman is valid, notwithstanding any prior sale or assignment of wages or any attachment, encumbrance, or arrestment of the wages.

365 actions against Blessett. The preservation of individual 5th amendment rights prevents the
366 state from taking Blessett’s property²⁰ without compensation.

367 Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power
368 “to regulate commerce between states, foreign territories, and maritime matters. Blessett
369 was engaged in foreign commerce and trade as an essential instrument on 46 U.S. Code
370 § 106 “documented vessels.” As an established by a federal statute 16 U.S.C. § 1453(6a)
371 that State “enforceable policies”²¹ are only legally binding through constitutional
372 provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative
373 decisions, in which a State exerts control over private and public land and water uses and
374 natural resources in the coastal zone. Therefore, the OAG exceeds the state agency’s
375 commerce authority for interstate and foreign child support debt collection and
376 enforcement without the federal contractual protection of Title IV-D of the Social Security
377 Act. The Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division enforced
378 a contract of Blessett in conflict with 15 U.S. Code § 1. Defendants had no legal right to
379 interfere with sister states’ commerce outside their territorial borders without the 10th
380 amendment protections under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Under admiralty
381 commerce, Blessett maritime wages are protected, Jones Act Seamen Protections 46
382 U.S.C. §§ 10312 and 10313. Without the documents required under 42 U.S.C. 654(12),
383 there is no way the OAG could be in compliance with the other due process spending
384 clause statutes in the ACT.

385 Blessett has made *diligent inquiries* about the existence of a valid judicial modification
386 to his Final Divorce Decree support order and evidence of the document required under

²⁰ 5th Amendment, Types of Takings, Many types of government action infringe on private property rights. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement is not limited to government seizures of real property. Instead, it extends to all kinds of tangible and intangible property, including but not limited to easements, personal property, contract rights, and trade secrets. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/takings> (Legal Information Institute)

²¹ 16 U.S. Code § 1453(6a)The term “enforceable policy” means State policies which are legally binding through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions, by which a State exerts control over private and public land and water uses and natural resources in the coastal zone.

387 42 U.S.C § 654 (12)²². Blessett has given legal notice to state and federal actors to correct
388 this injustice. A Notice of Acceptance was sent to Anthony Blinkin U.S. Department of
389 State, National Passport Center, 207 International Drive, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
390 03801-6827, Secretary of State, Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
391 Gregg Abbott, Texas governor, Ken Paxton, head of the Texas Of Attorney General Child
392 Support Enforcement Division and Steven C McCraw, head of Texas Dept. of Public
393 Safety by U.S. Postal Mail. Unfortunately, all parties named have failed to present a copy
394 of the documented legal instrument under 42 U.S.C. 654(12)²³ to legally trigger child
395 support collection and enforcement of a debt²⁴ under Title IV-D of the Social Security
396 Act. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a
397 binding obligation on the State. The accused’s activities represent a pattern of customs and
398 policies established over decades from a lack of oversight and accountability for their
399 actions. The state Title IV-D agencies operate as monopolies for child support debt
400 collections. In this civil action, the state agency disregarded Plaintiff’s private contract

²² Fed.Rule of Evidence 301. Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally. In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.

²³ 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) provide for the establishment of procedures to require the State to provide individuals who are applying for or receiving services under the State plan, or who are parties to cases in which services are being provided under the State plan—(B)with a copy of any order establishing or modifying a child support obligation, or (in the case of a petition for modification) a notice of determination that there should be no change in the amount of the child support award, within 14 days after issuance of such order or determination.

²⁴ 15 U.S.C § 1692g - Validation of debts (b) Disputed debts. If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.

401 through deceptive acts under the color of federal law. Joe Blessett is the creditor, and
402 JOSEPH C BLESSETT is the debtor, establishing Joe Blessett as the original creditor.
403 Nothing in equity has been given to JOSEPH C BLESSETT, and nothing in equity shall
404 be returned.

405 Ken Paxton's office has failed to establish consent before applying federal provisions
406 42 U.S.C. §654(31) 42 U.S.C. §652(k) and 42 U.S.C. §666 for Title IV-D services liens,
407 withholding from income, for denial of jury trial, reporting arrearages to credit bureaus,
408 suspend licenses, financial data matching, change in payee, securing assets, and denial of
409 a passport for nonpayment of child support. Ken Paxton ignored Blessett's legal notice as
410 a servant to the people, stepping outside of capacity as the Attorney General in charge of
411 all Texas Office of the Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division activities
412 within the borders of Texas.

413 Denial of Passport under 42 U.S.C. 652(k) Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is a 28
414 U.S.C. §1357 injury under federal law protections against the unlawful color of law
415 collection of Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV revenues. Blessett U.S. Passport privilege
416 is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and may not be denied under color of law.
417 Therefore, Ken Paxton and Steven C McCall had an obligation to answer Plaintiff's Notice
418 of Acceptance requesting proof of a judicial order for the child support debt under the
419 federal statute 42 U.S.C. 666(16) Title IV-D license suspension.

420 Blessett has performed an administrative process against Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton,
421 Steven C McCall, Xavier Becerra, and Anthony Blinkin. Defendants were given notice of
422 Acceptance by U.S. Postal Service with a financial obligation at their place of work. The
423 Defendants failed to answer the U.C.C. § 3-409(b) Notice of Acceptance in a reasonable
424 time. Accordingly, a U.C.C. § 3-409(c) fixed time was given in a Notice of Nonresponse,
425 a second opportunity to correct any defect or respond to the Notice of Acceptance by U.S.
426 Postal Mail at their place of work with return receipt.

427 Blessett July 23, 1999, Final Divorce Decree with a child support order is a legally
428 binding legal instrument. The burden of proof²⁵ is placed on the defendants to refute the
429 evidence established in the federal statutes and Blessett's legal instrument. The Defendants
430 must explain their actions and show what federal law or public right gave its agents and
431 contractors the right to infringe on Blessett's rights.

432 In this civil law, "*the defendant bears only the burden of explaining clear reasons for*
433 *its actions.*" *Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US 248 - Supreme Court*
434 *1981.* Case law has already established every state official that administrates a federally
435 funded program is acting under the color of law. *See Williams v. US, 396 F. 3d 412 -*
436 *Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 2005, See Tongol v Usery, 601F.2d 1091,*
437 *1097 (9th Circuit, 1979)* Specifically, the under-color-of-state-law doctrine may also apply
438 to individuals who act "with knowledge of and pursuant to a state-enforced custom
439 requiring" unconstitutional behavior. *See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 174*
440 *n. 44, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1617 n. 44, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).*

441 The application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is unconstitutional as a contract
442 for services. The U.S. Congressional Act offers no benefits to the child support debtor,
443 incentivizes the state agencies to pursue them under 42 U.S.C. 658a, and omit the language
444 in clear unambiguous that the program is voluntary. The program uses deception by
445 omitting key facts that would dissuade any sane nonprimary parent from using the
446 program. Defendants and its subordinates 45 C.F.R 302.34 contractors deprived Blessett
447 of commerce rights²⁶, ignoring the U.S Constitution's restrictions on government. The

²⁵ Fed.Rule of Evidence 301, Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally. In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally. https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_301 [Legal Information Institute]

²⁶ In *United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1032 (1st Cir. 1997)*, it was held that "state-court-imposed child support orders are 'functionally equivalent to interstate contracts,'" rejecting the idea that child support payment obligations are somehow a "different" kind of debt.

448 state court has policy issues that destabilize trust in the judicial system. The Title IV-D
449 agency has breached its contractual agreement under 42 U.S.C. § 654 of Title IV-D of the
450 Social Security Act. Prima Facie evidence proves an act of collusion between Congress and
451 Texas under 31 U.S.C. § 6305(1) ex contractu for profit using deception and concealment
452 against Blessett to create an adhesion contract to perform to pay or suffer from the
453 purposely concealed legal consequences.

454 The Family Law system is corrupt, with every individual involved profiting from it.
455 Blessett had a Texas-exempt homestead²⁷ real property seized in opposition to substantive
456 law. Blessett reported this to the Federal Bureau Of Investigation and filed a civil suit
457 against his ex-wife for fraud. The illegal enforcement of Title IV-D places a lien on
458 Blessett's property. Blessett recorded a Texas Property Code Sec. 520012²⁸
459 HOMESTEAD AFFIDAVIT AS RELEASE OF JUDGMENT LIEN as the bona fide
460 purchaser on May 3, 2017, with Galveston County Clerk's public property records. On
461 May 12, 2017, Stett M Jacoby as a Sinkin Law Firm representative, submitted a
462 contradictory affidavit on behalf of their client without a judgment listing the property
463 ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 – 2515 Merrimac, League City, TX 77573, ignoring Texas
464 Property Code²⁹ rules. Stett M Jacoby filed an affidavit in **JOE BLESSETT v. BEVERLY**

²⁷ Texas Family Code Sec. 157.317. PROPERTY TO WHICH LIEN ATTACHES. (b) A lien attaches to all non-homestead real property of the obligor but does not attach to a homestead exempt under the Texas Constitution or the Property Code. Texas Family Code Sec. 157.317. Sec. 157.3171. RELEASE OF LIEN ON HOMESTEAD PROPERTY. (a) An obligor who believes that a child support lien has attached to real property of the obligor that is the obligor's homestead, as defined by Section 41.002, Property Code, may file an affidavit to release the lien against the homestead in the same manner that a judgment debtor may file an affidavit under Section 52.0012, Property Code, to release a judgment lien against a homestead.

²⁸ Texas Property Code Sec. 52.0012 HOMESTEAD AFFIDAVIT AS RELEASE OF JUDGMENT LIEN (d) If a judgment debtor has filed a certificate of mailing under Subsection (b) and a contradicting affidavit is not filed under Subsection (e), a bona fide purchaser or a mortgagee for value or a successor or assign of a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for value may rely conclusively on an affidavit filed under Subsection (b) for the 90-day period that begins on the 31st day after the date the certificate of mailing was filed.

²⁹ Texas Property Code Sec. 52.001. ESTABLISHMENT OF LIEN. Except as provided by Section 52.0011 or 52.0012, a first or subsequent abstract of judgment, when it is recorded and indexed in

465 *ANN GARCIA,3:18-CV-00137 United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston*
466 *Division 2019* to support the lie of having a judgment listing the property ABST 9 Page 3
467 Lot 47 BLK 10 – 2515 Merrimac, League City, TX 77573 before filing a contradicting
468 affidavit with the Galveston County Clerk’s public property records. On December 5, 2017,
469 Sinkin & Barretto PLLC operating as Sinkin Law Firm, purchased the property at auction
470 for (\$65,000.00) sixty-five thousand dollars on December 5, 2017. Factual material
471 evidence³⁰ entered in civil case *3:18-cv-00137 Blessett v Garcia USDS 2019* shows Stett
472 M Jacoby client knew as early as March 4, 2016, the property located at 2515 Merrimac,
473 League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing before May 12, 2017,
474 had a homestead exemption. Stett M Jacoby and his client never objected to the emails and
475 are now adjudicated public evidence in civil case *3:18-cv-00137 Blessett v Garcia USDS*
476 *2019*. Sinkin Law Firm Attorney Stett M Jacoby placed a personal property lien on
477 Blessett’s protected property without a judicial order. Stett M Jacoby committed 18 U.S.C.
478 § 1623³¹ perjury in a federal court, stating he froze the property pending litigation.

accordance with this chapter, if the judgment is not then dormant, constitutes a lien on and attaches to any real property of the defendant, other than real property exempt from seizure or forced sale under Chapter 41, the Texas Constitution, or any other law, that is located in the county in which the abstract is recorded and indexed, including real property acquired after such recording and indexing.

³⁰ Fed.Rule of Evidence 803 (7) Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity.(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist;

Fed.Rule of Evidence 803(15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the document’s purpose — unless later dealings with the property are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

³¹ 18 U.S.C. § 1623 - False declarations before the court, (a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

479 On August 2021, Blessett requested information under Texas Government Code Sec.
480 552.001³² as to the Texas exempt ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 – 2515 Merrimac, League
481 City, TX 77573 exemption status before June 30, 2017, from Norman B. Franzke of the
482 Galveston Central Appraisal District with return receipt #9590 9402 4779 8344 5228 36
483 confirmation with a reply request list the plaintiff mailing address and email. Nick Perez,
484 staff attorney for the Galveston Central Appraisal District, responded with a confidential
485 notice by email. In addition, Nick Perez supplied an answer to the exemption status of the
486 property and the transfer date of the status. As a result, the property retained its exemption
487 status until the transfer date. For all of these activities to take place, there has to be policies
488 and customs in place at the local subdivision level to avoid the safeguards and legal
489 protections for child support debtors

490 It is not unusual for Blessett to be absent from the geographical area for months at a
491 time. Blessett has not received sufficient notice of any legal action on or after July 23 of
492 1999. The way the Texas Galveston County Court handled Blessett’s legal issues before a
493 judgment broke several civil procedural codes. Judge Barbara Roberts was allowed to
494 correct a mistake at law and decline. Roberts denied Blessett’s petitions to correct the
495 problem. Roberts is protected from her wrongdoings by her immunity as a state judge.
496 Wrong is wrong. Roberts knowledge of Blessett’s property exemption status before the
497 proceedings show tacit conduct with the intent to rule against Blessett regardless of the
498 facts. Roberts’s actions on the bench are without ensuring that Blessett was informed of
499 the hearing is an act outside of her official capacity as a judge. Roberts intended on
500 infringing on the Plaintiff’s property and the civil code required before a hearing can take

³² Texas Government Code Sec. 552.001. POLICY; CONSTRUCTION. (a) Under the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government that adheres to the principle that government is the servant and not the master of the people, it is the policy of this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this policy.

501 place. Blessett places on the record that proper notice of any hearing before a judgment on
502 protected property never happened. Blessett requested the City of Galveston to present
503 evidence of legal notice of service for a hearing before hearing for any judgment and a
504 signed order of modification of his Final Divorce Decree as per Texas Government Code
505 Sec. 552.001.

506 Under this form of civil law, any Texas citizen can take a vacation or be absent from
507 their property and lose ownership.

508 **Gregg Abbott**

509 Gregg Abott is in dishonor as per U.C.C. § 3-505 through his tacit knowledge of the
510 financial and legal terms within the legal instruments received from Blessett. Child support
511 orders are interstate contracts with interstate commerce protections. U.S. Congress
512 intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a binding obligation
513 on the State.

514 Gregg Abott has acquiesced³³ to Blessett's Notice of Nonresponse terms through
515 silence. Blessett U.S. Passport privilege is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and
516 may not be denied under color of law. Blessett's Denial of Passport under 42 U.S.C. 652(k)
517 Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is a 28 U.S.C. §1357 injury under federal law
518 protections against the unlawful color of law collection of Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter
519 IV revenues. As the Texas state governor³⁴ and Chief Executive Officer, Abbott had tacit

³³ Acquiescence - A person's tacit or passive acceptance, implied consent to an act. **Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edition**

³⁴ Texas Family Code Sec. 231.002 (d) Consistent with federal law and any international treaty or convention to which the United States is a party and that has been ratified by the United States Congress, the Title IV-D agency may: (1) on approval by and in cooperation with the governor, pursue negotiations and enter into reciprocal arrangements with the federal government, another state, or a foreign country or a political subdivision of the federal government, state, or foreign country to: (A) establish and enforce child support obligations; and (B) establish mechanisms to enforce an order providing for possession of or access to a child rendered under Chapter 153; (2) spend money appropriated to the agency for child support enforcement to engage in international child support enforcement; and (3) spend other money appropriated to the agency necessary for the agency to conduct the agency's activities under Subdivision (1).

520 and explicit knowledge of the Plaintiff's opposition to the unlawful Title IV-D enforcement
521 with authority to correct Ken Paxton's state attorney general's activities for Texas. Abbot
522 could have prevented further actions under, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242,
523 and 245 deprivation of Blessett's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the U.S.
524 Constitution protections and laws he did nothing. Gregg Abbott is liable in his unofficial
525 capacity to the injured party for his inaction in this action at law and suit in equity under
526 federal statutes and codes. Gregg Abbot declined the opportunity to correct the unlawful
527 child support enforcement in his official capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of Texas.
528 Mr. Abbott ignored Blessett's legal notice as a servant to the people, stepping outside of
529 capacity as the governor in charge of all Texas executive branch activities within the
530 borders of Texas. Gregg Abott had the opportunity to point and cure any defects in
531 Blessett's legal instruments upon receiving the Notice of Nonresponse. Through his tacit
532 conduct, Gregg Abbott has acquiesced to Blessett terms and is legally responsible for the
533 monetary terms agreed to in the Notice of Nonresponse. Plaintiff is protected under the
534 U.S. Constitution Commerce Clause and Contract Clause. *Invalid Executive branch Title*
535 *IV-D administrative order will never grow up to be valid Judicial Branch court orders*
536 *without committing an unlawful or a correctable mistake of law by applying mandatory*
537 *public law. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Steven C McCraw cannot escape liabilities of*
538 *the unlawful color of law actions. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Steven C McCraw were*
539 *allowed to correct an administrative law mistake and willfully ignored Blessett's request*
540 *for relief.*

- 541
- 542 1. Admit or deny Gregg Abott received **Notice of Acceptance return receipt #9590**
543 **9402 3652 7335 3554 36 8344 5227 44** to pay Blessett?
 - 544 2. Admit or deny that on June 14, 2021, Gregg Abbot received a Notice of Acceptance
545 by U.S. Postal Mail requesting to remedy color of law injuries imposed on Blessett
546 by the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division in the
547 enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act?

- 548 3. Admit or deny Gregg Abott was given a second opportunity by Notice of
549 Nonresponse return receipt #9590 9402 4779 8344 5227 44 to correct any
550 mistakes, cure the instruments, or provide a remedy?
- 551 4. Admit or deny through his tacit conduct, Gregg Abbott has acquiesced to Blessett
552 terms and is legally responsible for the monetary terms agreed to in the Notice of
553 Nonresponse?
- 554 5. Admit or deny Gregg Abott he did not respond to Plaintiff's request?

555 Plaintiff requests the court grant an order as agreed; Gregg Abbott delivers one hundred
556 thousand dollars \$100,000.00 per day charge to be paid to Joseph Blessett for each day
557 after June 9, 2021, receipt of the presentment Notice of Acceptance.

558

559 **TEXAS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CHILD SUPPORT**
560 **ENFORCEMENT DIVISION**

561 The Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division's presence has
562 been requested under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

563 The Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division³⁵, the
564 attorney general's office, is designated as the state's Title IV-D agency. Title IV-D is a
565 voluntary federal program requiring informed consent from a noncustodial parent before
566 enforcing the U.S. Congressional Act. Under the U.S Constitution, restrictions on state
567 government and the federal statutes within Title IV-D of the Social Security Act prevent
568 the state Title IV-D agencies from defaulting a noncustodial parent into a contractual
569 financial obligation for refusal to participate in the program. Unfortunately, the Texas Title
570 IV-D Agency ignored Blessett's rights, privileges, immunities secured by the U.S.
571 Constitution restrictions on state government and laws.

³⁵ Texas Family Code Sec.231.001. DESIGNATION OF TITLE IV-D AGENCY. The office of the attorney general is designated as the state 's Title IV-D agency.

572 The Texas Title IV-D Agency application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does
573 not comply with federal statutes governing the U.S. Congressional Act. The Texas Title
574 IV-D Agency did not comply with 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) before applying Title IV-D
575 enforcement against Blessett. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42
576 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a binding obligation on the State. The Texas Title IV-D Agency
577 enforced Denial of Passport against Blessett in 2005 under 42 U.S.C. 652(k) of Title IV-D
578 of the Social Security Act before complying with 42 U.S.C. § 654(12). The Texas Title
579 IV-D Agency enforced Title IV-D license suspension against Blessett on September 22,
580 2014, under the federal statute 42 U.S.C. 666(16) of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act
581 before complying with 42 U.S.C. § 654(12). The Texas Title IV-D agency does not have
582 a copy of the judicial order modifying Blessett's July 23, 1999, Final Divorce Decree
583 support order. Plaintiff is protected under the U.S. Constitution uniform *Commerce Clause*
584 and *Contract Clause*. Child support orders are interstate contracts with interstate commerce
585 protections. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42 U.S.C. 654(12)
586 imposing a binding obligation on the State.

587 Ken Paxton has acquiesced to Blessett's Notice of Nonresponse terms through his silence.
588 Paxton had tacit and explicit knowledge of Title IV-D enforcement with the authority to
589 correct his subordinate activities. Instead, Ken Paxton did nothing to prevent further 34
590 U.S.C. § 12601 actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245 deprivation
591 of Blessett's rights, privileges, immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution restrictions on
592 state government and law. As the Texas Attorney General, Ken Paxton could have inquired
593 and had the staff available to correct Blessett's Title IV-D agency's problem.

594 Ken Paxton and the Texas Title IV-D agency³⁶ must adhere to 45 CFR § 303.107. Paxton
595 is responsible for the policies and customs in the application of the Texas Title IV-D

³⁶ **45 CFR § 303.107** - Requirements for cooperative arrangements. The State must ensure that all cooperative arrangements: (a) Contain a clear description of the specific duties, functions and responsibilities of each party; (b) Specify clear and definite standards of performance which meet Federal requirements; (c) Specify that the parties will comply with title IV-D of the Act,

596 program. The Texas Title IV-D program claimed JOSEPH C BLESSETT owed a debt. By
597 law, to protect uniform commerce, Ken Paxton had an obligation to answer Plaintiff's
598 Notice of Acceptance. Ken Paxton's conduct was outside his official capacity in the child
599 support enforcement against JOSEPH C BLESSETT. Ken Paxton had the opportunity to
600 point out and cure any defects in Blessett's legal instruments upon receiving the Notice of
601 Nonresponse. Ken Paxton has acquiesced to Blessett's terms and is legally responsible for
602 the monetary terms agreed to in the Notice of Acceptances through his tacit conduct.

603 Ken Paxton's office is the designated Title IV-D agency³⁷ in Texas and has the power
604 to enforce child support orders and collect and distribute support payments. However, Ken
605 Paxton's and his subordinates never followed the judicial Title IV-D spending clause
606 requirements against Blessett. Therefore, they could not produce an instrument of showing
607 informed consent or a valid judicial order. Furthermore, the right to establish Title IV-D
608 services against a child support debtor is not an established contractual right to enforce.
609 Therefore, Ken Paxton is in dishonor as per U.C.C. § 3-505 through his tacit knowledge of
610 the financial and legal terms within the legal instruments received from Blessett.

611 1. Admit or deny religious beliefs³⁸ or opinions are not admissible evidence to attack
612 or support an argument against the Plaintiff?

implementing Federal regulations and any other applicable Federal regulations and requirements;
(d) Specify the financial arrangements including budget estimates, covered expenditures, methods
of determining costs, procedures for billing the IV-D agency, and any relevant Federal and State
reimbursement requirements and limitations; (e) Specify the kind of records that must be
maintained and the appropriate Federal, State and local reporting and safeguarding requirements;
and (f) Specify the dates on which the arrangement begins and ends, any conditions for revision
or renewal, and the circumstances under which the arrangement may be terminated.

³⁷ *TEX. FAM.CODE § 231.104(b) ("An application for child support services is an assignment of support rights to enable the Title IV-D agency to establish and enforce child support and medical support obligations...."). Office of Atty. Gen. of Texas v. Scholer*

³⁸ **Federal Rules of Evidence 610** Evidence of a witness's religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness's credibility.

- 613 2. Admit or deny the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement
614 Division did not have the legal capacity to enforce under Title IV-D program against
615 JOSEPH C BLESSETT?
- 616 3. Admit or deny the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement
617 Division did not comply with federal statute 42 U.S.C. 654(12) Title IV-D of the
618 Social Security Act before enforcing 42 U.S.C. 666(16) license suspension against
619 JOSEPH C BLESSETT?
- 620 4. Admit or deny the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement
621 Division was not in compliance with federal statute 42 U.S.C. 654(12) Title IV-D
622 of the Social Security Act before enforcing Denial of U.S. passport under federal
623 statute 42 U.S.C. 652(k) against JOSEPH C BLESSETT?
- 624 5. Admit or deny the U.S. Constitution prevents JOSEPH C BLESSETT from
625 defaulting on a Title IV-D contract for services without prior consent to Title IV-D
626 services?
- 627 6. Admit or deny the Texas Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement
628 Division infringed on the Plaintiff's rights?

629 **Ken Paxton**

630 Ken Paxton is charged in his unofficial capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C.
631 §1357, 18 U.S.C. § § 241, 242, and 245, for inaction, not stopping deprivation and
632 infringement of Blessett's rights under the color of federal law. Blessett seeks payment for
633 the agreed terms of the Notice of Nonresponse. Ken Paxton was given consideration and
634 the opportunity to decline or accept Blessett's offer. Ken Paxton has implicitly ratified the
635 contract terms through the *Tacit-Admissions Doctrine*. Ken Paxton is in dishonor as per
636 U.C.C. § 3-505 through his tacit knowledge of the financial and legal terms within the legal
637 instruments received from Blessett. Child support orders are interstate contracts with
638 interstate commerce protections. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42
639 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a binding obligation on the State. *Invalid Executive branch Title*
640 *IV-D administrative order will never grow up to be valid Judicial Branch court orders*

641 *without committing an unlawful* or a correctable mistake of law by applying mandatory
642 public law. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Steven C McCraw cannot escape liabilities of
643 the unlawful color of law actions. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Steven C McCraw were
644 given the notice to correct an administrative law mistake and willfully ignored Blessett's
645 request for relief.

- 646 1. Admit or deny that Ken Paxton received a *Notice of Acceptance return receipt*
647 *#9590 9402 3652 7335 3554 74* to pay Joe Blessett.
- 648 2. Admit or deny that on June 9, 2021, Ken Paxton received a notice by U.S. Postal
649 Mail?
- 650 3. Admit or deny that color of law injuries was imposed on Blessett by the Texas
651 Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division to enforce Title
652 IV-D of the Social Security Act?
- 653 4. Admit or deny that Paxton was given a second opportunity by *Notice of*
654 *Nonresponse return receipt #9590 9402 4779 8344 5227 68* to correct any mistakes
655 or provide a remedy.
- 656 5. Admit or deny that Ken Paxton did not respond to Plaintiff's request?
- 657 6. Admit or deny that Ken Paxton did nothing to prevent deprivation and
658 infringement?
- 659 7. Admit or deny that Ken Paxton is acting under federal statutes listed in Title IV-D
660 of the Social Security Act?

661

662 Plaintiff requests the court grant an order as agreed; Ken Paxton delivers one hundred
663 thousand dollars \$100,000.00 per day charge to be paid to Joseph Blessett for each day
664 after June 9, 2021, receipt of the presentment Notice of Acceptance.

665 Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution,
666 Xavier Becerra, Anthony Blinkin, Gregg Abbott, and Ken Paxton must follow the federal
667 statutes, located in Part D of Title IV of the federal Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 654 et

668 seq. Under the program’s guidelines, Texas “at a minimum” must establish a state registry
669 consisting of “[e]very IV-D case receiving child support enforcement services under an
670 approved State plan; and ... [e]very support order established or modified in the State on
671 or after October 1, 1998.” 45 C.F.R. §§ 307.11; 307.11(e)(2)(i)-(ii). The state case registry
672 also must contain certain “[s]tandardized data elements” for every program participant.
673 *Id.* § 307.11(e)(3). These standardized elements “shall include . . . Names . . . Social security
674 numbers . . . Dates of birth . . . Case identification numbers ... Other uniform identification
675 numbers ... [and] Data elements required under paragraph (f)(1) of this section necessary
676 for the operation of the Federal case registry.” *Id.* § 307.11(e)(3)(i)-(vi) (emphasis added).
677 **Office of the Atty. Gen. of Texas, 456 SW 3d 153 - Tex: Supreme Court 2015.** State
678 legislation and enforcement activities are permitted if they do not necessarily infringe any
679 right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by the
680 amendments thereto. **Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623** TEX. FAM.CODE §§ 231.001,
681 .101(a)(5)-(6). Among its powers is the ability to seek a court order to withhold income
682 from a child support obligor’s disposable earnings. TEX. FAM.CODE §§ 102.007
683 (authorizing Title IV-D agencies to file suits for modification or motions to enforce child
684 support orders), 158.006 (a court or a Title IV-D agency “shall order that income be
685 withheld from [obligor’s] disposable earnings”); see also *id.* §§ 231.001, .002, .101
686 (describing the powers, services, and duties of a Title IV-D agency, including enforcement,
687 collection, and distribution of child support payments). **Office of Atty. Gen. of Texas v.**
688 **Scholer, 403 SW 3d 859 - Tex: Supreme Court 2013**

689 TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

690 The Texas Department of Public Safety presence has been requested under 28 U.S.C.
691 §§ 2201 and 2202.

692 The Texas Department of Public Safety cannot deny the freedom to travel without a
693 contract or evidence of injury in fact and the physical presence of the injured party to secure

694 due process³⁹. The Texas Title IV-D Agency enforced Title IV-D license suspension⁴⁰
695 against Blessett on September 22, 2014, under the federal statute 42 U.S.C. 666(16) of
696 Title IV-D of the Social Security Act before complying with 42 U.S.C. § 654(12). Child
697 support orders are interstate contracts with interstate commerce protections. STEVEN C
698 MCCALL was notified of unlawful Title IV-D administrative enforcement under 42 U.S.C.
699 666(16) of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. As the top law enforcement officer for
700 the Texas Department of Public Safety, Steven C McCall had tacit knowledge of the
701 Plaintiff's opposition to the unlawful Title IV-D enforcement with authority to correct his
702 subordinate activities for the Texas Title IV-D program. Steven C McCall could have
703 prevented further actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. § 242 deprivation of
704 Blessett's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution to protect the
705 right to travel and civil procedural laws. He did nothing, and it is implicit conduct. Steven
706 C McCall is liable to the party injured in this action at law and suit in equity under federal
707 codes and U.S Constitution.

708 As the head of the Texas Department of Safety, Steven C McCall could have enquired
709 and had the staff correct Blessett's Title IV-D agency's driver's license problem. Steven
710 C McCall's responsibilities include the subordinates' policies and customs following the
711 lawful application of state codes, federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. Steven C
712 McCall had an obligation to answer Plaintiff's Notice of Acceptance requesting proof of a
713 judicial order for the child support debt under the federal statute 42 U.S.C. 666(16) Title
714 IV-D license suspension. Child support orders are interstate contracts with interstate
715 commerce protections. Steven C McCall could correct the unlawful administrative child
716 support enforcement in his OFFICIAL CAPACITY. Instead, Steven C McCall ignored
717 Blessett's legal notice as a servant to the people, stepping outside of capacity as the Director

³⁹ . Under ***Reno v. Condon, 528 US 141(2000)***, *The activity license by the state Department of Motor Vehicle and in connection with which individuals must submit personal information to the DMV for the operation of motor vehicles is itself integrally related to interstate commerce.*

⁴⁰ ***Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116 (1958)*** *was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment*

718 and Colonel of the Texas Department of Public Safety activities within the borders of
719 Texas. Steven C McCall had the opportunity to point out and cure any defects in Blessett's
720 legal instruments upon receiving the Notice of Nonresponse from Plaintiff. Instead, Steven
721 C McCall has acquiesced to Blessett terms and is legally responsible for the monetary terms
722 agreed to in the Notice of Acceptances through **Tacit-Admissions Doctrine**.

- 723 1. Admit or deny the Texas Department of Public Safety is acting under federal statutes
724 listed in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to suspend JOSEPH C BLESSETT
725 driver license privileges?
- 726 2. Admit or deny the Texas Department of Public Safety does not have a judicial order
727 to suspend JOSEPH C BLESSETT driver license privileges?

728 **Steven C McCall**

729 Steven C McCall is in dishonor as per U.C.C. § 3-505 through his tacit knowledge of
730 the financial and legal terms within the legal instruments received from Blessett. *Invalid*
731 *Executive branch Title IV-D administrative order will never grow up to be valid Judicial*
732 *Branch court orders without committing an unlawful or a correctable mistake of law by*
733 *applying mandatory public law. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Steven C McCraw cannot*
734 *escape liabilities of the unlawful color of law actions. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and*
735 *Steven C McCraw were allowed to correct an administrative law mistake and willfully*
736 *ignored Blessett's request for relief.*

- 737 3. Admit or deny that Steven C McCall received a **Notice of Acceptance with return**
738 **receipt #9590 9402 3652 7335 3554 50** to pay Joe Blessett'?
- 739 4. Admit or deny that on June 9, 2021, Steven C McCall received the notice by U.S.
740 Postal Mail?
- 741 5. Admit or deny that color of law injuries was imposed on Blessett by the Texas
742 Office of Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Division to enforce Title
743 IV-D of the Social Security Act?

- 744 6. Admit or deny that Steven C McCall failed to respond in a timely manner to the
745 request and was given a second opportunity by Notice of Nonresponse return
746 receipt #9590 9402 4779 8344 5227 to correct any mistakes or provide a remedy?
747 7. Admit or deny that Steven C McCall did not respond to Plaintiff's request?
748 8. Admit or deny that Steven C McCall is acting under federal statutes listed in the
749 Social Security Act?

750 Plaintiff requests the court grant an order as agreed, and Steven C McCall to deliver
751 one hundred thousand dollars \$100,000.00 per day charge to be paid to Joseph Blessett for
752 each day after June 9, 2021, receipt of the presentment Notice of Acceptance.

753 *Invalid Executive branch Title IV-D administrative order will never grow up to be valid*
754 *Judicial Branch court orders without committing an unlawful or a correctable mistake of*
755 *law by applying mandatory public law. Ken Paxton and Steven C McCraw cannot escape*
756 *liabilities of the unlawful color of law actions. Ken Paxton and Steven C McCraw were*
757 *allowed to correct an administrative law mistake and willfully ignored Blessett's request*
758 *for relief.*

759 **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES**

760 THE PRESENCE OF the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
761 SERVICES has been requested under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

762 The U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES is the executive
763 agency in charge of the oversight and enforcement of state Title IV-D programs as per 42
764 U.S.C. §652. The executive agency allowed the Texas Title IV-D program to omit 42
765 U.S.C. 654(12) in this civil action. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of
766 42 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a binding obligation on the State. U.S. Congress did provide
767 the U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH OF AND HUMAN SERVICES or the States with the
768 power to create new federal statutes or states laws not explicitly listed in the Act. Texas
769 has breached the terms of their state plan provided to the U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH
770 OF AND HUMAN SERVICES for the federal program. Blessett's U.S. Passport is a U.S.

771 Federal Government privilege protected under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and may not be
772 denied under color of law.

- 773 1. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
774 is acting under federal statutes listed in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act?
- 775 2. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
776 lack the legal capacity to enforce Title IV-D provisions against JOSEPH C
777 BLESSETT?

778 **Xavier Becerra**

779 Xavier Becerra is charged in his unofficial capacity under 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C.
780 § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligence that allowed Texas Title IV-D agency's
781 noncompliance.

- 782 1. Admit or deny that Xavier Becerra is in a position to apply Title IV-D spending
783 clause enforcement against the state agency?
- 784 2. Admit or deny that U.S. Congress intended the Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42
785 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing a binding obligation on the State?
- 786 3. Admit or deny that Xavier Becerra has a required duty to perform under Title IV-D
787 of the Social Security Act?
- 788 4. Admit or deny that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary)
789 operates the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) agency responsible for
790 administering the child support enforcement Title IV-D program?
- 791 5. Admit or deny that the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
792 SERVICES is responsible for the actions of the OCSE employee's administrative
793 action that cause harm to individuals under an Act of Congress?
- 794 6. Admit or deny that under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1975, OCSE is
795 accountable for developing child support policy, oversight, evaluation, and audits
796 of the Texas and Tribal child support programs?
- 797 7. Admit or deny that a U.S. Passport is a U.S. Federal Government privilege protected
798 under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and may not be denied under color of law?

- 799 8. Admit or deny that Xavier Becerra is required to assure federal statutes listed in
800 Title IV-D of the Social Security Act are upheld by the contracted state’s application
801 of the program?
- 802 9. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
803 never performed a quality control audit of Texas Title IV-D program services
804 provided to the noncustodial parents?
- 805 10. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
806 never performed a financial audit for fraudulent charges or misappropriation of the
807 reimbursement payments paid to Texas for Title IV-D program administrative
808 services?
- 809 11. Admit or deny that the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
810 SERVICES never performed a Texas Title IV-D agency audit to comply with the
811 U.S. Constitution and federal statutes for enforcement of Title IV-D program
812 services?
- 813 12. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
814 never performed a quality control audit on any state agency Title IV-D program
815 services provided to the noncustodial parents?
- 816 13. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
817 never performed an independent third-party financial audit for fraudulent charges
818 or misappropriation of the reimbursement payments paid to any state Title IV-D
819 agencies for Title IV-D program administrative services?
- 820 14. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
821 contracted Title IV-D state agencies have no enforceable rights to recoup Title IV-
822 A benefits against noncustodial parents without their consent to the terms of Title
823 IV-D?

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE presence has been requested under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Blessett’s U.S. Passport is a U.S. Federal Government privilege protected under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and may not be denied under color of law.

1. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE is acting under federal statutes listed in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to deny Blessett’s U.S. Passport privileges?
2. Admit or deny the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE must comply with the federal provisions of the U.S. Constitution?

Anthony Blinkin

Anthony Blinkin is charged in his unofficial capacity under actions 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §1357, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245. Additionally, Anthony Blinkin is in dishonor as per U.C.C. § 3-505 through his tacit knowledge of the financial and legal terms within the legal instruments received from Blessett.

1. Admit or deny that Anthony Blinkin received notice to send a copy of the instrument certifying the Denial of U.S. passport under federal statute 42 U.S.C. 652(k) Title IV-D of the Social Security Act?
2. Admit or deny that Anthony Blinkin received a legal instrument from Plaintiff through an administrative process to set off the alleged Title IV-D financial claim?
3. Admit or deny that Anthony Blinkin failed to respond on time to the request?
4. Admit or deny that a U.S. Passport is a U.S. Federal Government privilege protected under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(B) and may not be denied under color of law?
5. Admit or deny that Anthony Blinkin did nothing to prevent Blessett’s deprivation?
6. Admit or deny that the U.S. Dept. of State is acting under federal statutes listed in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to deny Plaintiff’s request?

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Texas

The Texas presence has been requested under federal statute 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

The penalties under the Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 and Sec.232.0022 *Suspension or Nonrenewal of Motor Vehicle Registration* are not stated in the clear, unambiguous language under Title IV-D of the Social Security as an enforcement tool for child support enforcement and collections. The Codes must be part of the Texas state-approved plan submitted to the Secretary to attach it to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act enforcement.

The two Texas civil codes only apply individual penalties and burdens on a specific class of commercial debtors. Under the application of a Cooperative Federalism Title IV-D contract, the Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 and Sec.232.0022 cannot deny equal liberty⁴¹ to only child support commercial debt within a State. The state cannot enact any state laws or state constitutional amendments that prohibit equal privileges, liberties, and freedoms to all people. Texas is charged with codifying state laws against child support debtors that interfere with the freedom to travel⁴² under Texas Family Code Sec.232.0022.

Nothing in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in unambiguous terms allows the state-

⁴¹ **Bond v. US, 564 US 211 - Supreme Court 2011** Federalism has more than one dynamic. In allocating powers between the States and National Government, federalism "secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power," **New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120.** It enables States to enact positive law in response to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times, and it protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that law enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See **Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410.** Federalism's limitations are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. In a proper case, a litigant may challenge a law as enacted in contravention of federalism, just as injured individuals may challenge actions that transgress, e.g., separation-of-powers limitations, see, e.g., **INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317.** The claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a State's constitutional interests, even if those interests are also implicated. Pp. 2363-2366. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14974593486511807773&q=10th+amendment&hl=en&as_sdt=4,60

⁴² **Davis v. Wechsler , 263 US 22, 24.** "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

869 contracted agencies to interfere with motor vehicle registration for child support
870 enforcement or recoup Title IV-A federal revenue.

871 Title IV-D of the Social security 42 U.S. Code § 653a (a)(1)(B) is clear concerning civil
872 money penalties on noncomplying employers. Title IV-D of the Social security 42 U.S.
873 Code § 653a (d) is clear concerning civil money penalties on noncomplying employers
874 (\$25) twenty-five-dollar fee for failure to comply and up to (\$500) for a conspiracy between
875 the employer and employee failing to *report new hire*. The federal statute does not allow
876 Texas Civil Code Sec. 158.210 burdens on employers to withhold wages or pay a fine of
877 two hundred (\$200.00) dollars for each occurrence of the employer failing to withhold
878 income for a child support debt. Nothing in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in
879 unambiguous terms allows the state-contracted agencies to burden⁴³ employers with a two
880 hundred (\$200.00) dollars fine for failure to withhold wages. Texas Civil Code Sec.
881 158.210 is harassment and coercion⁴⁴ at the child support debtor's place of employment
882 for commercial debt. The employer is under no legal obligation to breach the agreement
883 with the employee and must pay the employee the agreed amount. The U.S. Constitution
884 or the civil right acts prohibit targeting a specific group or class with unfair and unequal
885 laws in equity.

886 Any request under the color of any law is contrary to the U.S. Constitution restrictions on
887 government is invalid and cannot be enforced without consent of all parties in unambiguous
888 language naming the parties consenting. The U.S. Constitution prohibits state government

⁴³ 15 U.S.C. 1692 (d) Interstate commerce. Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce. "No State shall convert a liberty into a license and charge a fee. "**Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105**, Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce (**McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56-58**), although it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from, that commerce, so long as those taxes are not discriminatory.

⁴⁴ 15 U.S.C. 1692 (a) Abusive practices. There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.

889 interference or infringement on private contracts. Title IV-D of the Social security Act is a
890 voluntary federal program requiring informed consent from all parties.

891 U.S. Congress took great precautions not to include language in the Title IV-D of the
892 Social Security Act that interferes with U.S. Constitution protections for private contracts
893 and agreements between employers, employees, and contract services providers. Any
894 penalties not listed in the federal statutes breach the terms of the contract under Title IV-D
895 of the Social Security Act. Texas Sec.232.0022 *Suspension or Nonrenewal of Motor*
896 *Vehicle Registration is meant to prevent child support debtors from traveling goes against*
897 *previously established stare decisis. Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116 (1958) was the first case*
898 *in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the right to travel is a part of the “liberty” of*
899 *which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment*

900 Texas denies child support debtors 14th amendment, equal protections Texas Family
901 Code Sec. 158.210, and Sec.232.0022. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act requires that
902 5th amendment protections be imposed to protect the child support debtors under the federal
903 statutes of the U.S. Congressional Act. No injured parties have presented the enforcement
904 for the accused to face their accuser. Therefore, the civil codes are imposed without due
905 process in a court of law. The codes violate the rights of a specific class of interstate debtor
906 contracts without political clout with unequal protection under state law and uniform
907 commerce under federal law protections. Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas
908 Family Code Sec. 158.210 are bills of attainder and 8th amendment violations as excessive
909 fines and taxes. While the claim of a Bill of Attainder⁴⁵ is valid, there is no doubt that the

⁴⁵ **Article I, Section 9, Clause 3. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.** “Bills of attainder . . . are such special acts of the legislature, as inflict capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a bill of pains and penalties. . . . In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without any of the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are within its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence, or not. In short, in all such cases, the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretion, being governed solely by what it deems political necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears, or unfounded suspicions.” See

910 Texas Codes are bills of pains and penalties. The Texas legislators assumed judicial duties,
911 pronouncing guilt upon the parties without any safeguards for a trial and satisfying the
912 rules of evidence. The States are without power to disregard the U.S. Constitution to
913 impose and create a tax penalty for the federal program enforcement. U.S. Congress did
914 not explicitly delegate the authority to them under the ACT. The Texas Codes are not fees
915 for services provided by the state to improve the Title IV-D program. They are legislative
916 bills of pains and penalties to benefit state coffers for unfounded reasons at law and in
917 equity, the very definition of the Bill of Attainder.

918 The State's creation of new penalties and taxes not explicitly listed in the federal Act
919 conflict with the powers intended for U.S. Congress. Texas cannot create new taxes and
920 penalties for Title IV-D contracts without breaching U.S. Constitutional issues for
921 separation of powers. U.S. Congress intended for federal statutes under Title IV-D of the
922 Social Security Act as the terms for contractual enforcement. In contrast, the Texas
923 legislation moves away from the listed penalties to discriminate against a specific class of
924 debtors without political clout with unequal treatment under public law for interstate
925 contracts and commerce.

926 Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 *Suspension or Nonrenewal of Motor Vehicle*
927 *Registration* enforcement is outside of the listed terms of the Title IV-D of the Social
928 Security Act for enforcement and collection. It is noncompliant with the terms of the Act.
929 For the state to enforce the action under Title IV-D administrative order, the state would
930 deny the child support debtor the right of the Citizen to travel by exercising a penalty not
931 established for Title IV-D enforcement under the Act. The state breaches its contract with
932 the child support debtor under the color of law administrative action without due process.
933 Under *Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law,*
934 *section 329, page 1135, "The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and*

Footnote 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1338 (1833)The phrase "bill of attainder," as used in this clause and in clause 1 of § 10, applies to bills of pains and penalties as well as to the traditional bills of attainder. See **United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-442 (1965)** **<https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-9/clause-3/bills-of-attainder#fn2art1>**

935 *to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common*
936 *right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property,*
937 *and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary*
938 *and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right*
939 *to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon,*
940 *for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.”* The state knows this will cost
941 indigent child support debtors more in fines for lack of auto registration. It is a tool used to
942 coerce uneducated indigent child support debtors to consent. To Title IV-D under the color
943 of law by agreement with the state Title IV-D agency to have the privilege to register your
944 private automobile for use on highways and roads.

945 *. **Brooks v. United States 267 US 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699***⁴⁶*Congress can*
946 *certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of*
947 *such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil*
948 *or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this, it is merely*
949 *exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate*
950 *commerce. **Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215, 5 S. Ct. 826, 29 L.***
951 ***Ed. 158. US v. Ballinger, 395 F. 3d 1218 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2005 the state***
952 ***agency** Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 *Suspension or Nonrenewal of Motor Vehicle*
953 *Registration* from its inception was fraudulent use of Title IV-D to capitalize on the Act.
954 The U.S. Supreme Court and the Act prevent the state agencies from suspending driver’s
955 licenses of indigent child support debtors as expressed in 15 U.S.C. 1692(d). The state
956 agencies abuse child support debtors with administrative law without full knowledge to
957 consent to waive due process. Child support debtors under this Texas code are singled out*

⁴⁶ **Brooks v. United States 267 US 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699** Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this it is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate commerce. **Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215, 5 S. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158. US v. Ballinger, 395 F. 3d 1218 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2005,** https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=242971736804696810&q=Brooks+v.+United+States,+267+U.S.+432,&hl=en&as_sdt=4,60 (Google Scholar)

958 for special treatment, denying equal privileges. Without consent, it is dishonest dealing that
959 harms the child support debtor's liberty to operate an automobile thereon for the usual and
960 ordinary purpose of life and business in Texas or across state territorial boundaries. The
961 state action prevents the child support debtor from engaging in interstate commerce upon
962 public highways without expressing a reasonable right to infringe beyond debt collection.
963 The Texas Family Codes collectively limit the advancement of noncustodial parents and
964 ultimately give noncustodial parents the status of second-class citizens.

965 We request this court declare the Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 and Sec.232.0022
966 repugnant to the U.S. Constitution prohibited by state government restrictions,
967 noncompliant with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act for enforcement. Texas must
968 exercise its rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 for a proper presentation of the
969 evidence, facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality as per Federal Rule of
970 Civil Procedure 7.

971

- 972 1. Admit or deny Texas does not apply Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 to all
973 delinquent interstate contract debtors?
- 974 2. Admit or deny Texas does not enforce Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 on all
975 interstate contract debtors employers?
- 976 3. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 does not benefit the noncustodial
977 parent?
- 978 4. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 does not benefit the noncustodial
979 parent?
- 980 5. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 only applies to noncustodial
981 parents?
- 982 6. Admit or deny noncustodial parents the right to travel to engage in uniform intrastate
983 and interstate commerce without state government infringement is a fundamental
984 right granted in the U.S. Constitution?

- 985 7. Admit or deny the state did not submit⁴⁷ Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and
986 Texas Family Code Sec. 158.210 as part of the 42 U.S.C. 654 state plan for Title
987 IV-D enforcement?
- 988 8. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas Family Code Sec.
989 158.210 were not approved by U.S. Congress to enforce a Social Security Act?
- 990 9. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas Family Code Sec.
991 158.210 is a coercive tactic?
- 992 10. Admit or deny Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas Family Code Sec.
993 158.210 are additional burdens only on child support debtors?
- 994 11. Admit or deny that Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas Family Code Sec.
995 158.210 only apply to a specific set of debtors?
- 996 12. Admit or deny that Texas Family Code Sec. 232.0022 and Texas Family Code Sec.
997 158.210 are discriminatory against a disadvantaged⁴⁸ group of debtors?
- 998 13. Admit or deny the deadbeat moniker is implicit bias, established in the H.R.
999 Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 signed by Bill Clinton?
- 1000 14. Admit or deny that Texas is acting under federal statutes listed in Title IV-D of the
1001 Social Security Act?
- 1002 15. Admit or deny that a Texas Title IV-D agency was paid to enforce Title IV-D
1003 administrative penalties against JOSEPH C BLESSETT without the due process?

⁴⁷ Under State plan requirements 45 CFR Part 302.17 Inclusion of State statutes. The State plan shall provide a copy of State statutes, or regulations promulgated pursuant to such statutes and having the force of law (including citations of such statutes and regulations), that provide procedures to determine the paternity of a child born out of wedlock, to establish the child support obligation of a responsible parent, and to enforce a support obligation, including spousal support if appropriate. **Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute** <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/45/302.17>

⁴⁸ Disadvantaged 1. Having been prejudiced by something that hinders or prevents success. 2. Having social problems such as low income or lack of education, both of which make it hard to succeed. **Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition**

1004 16. Admit or deny that a Texas Title IV-D agency submitted fraudulent charges to the
1005 U.S. Government for illegal Title IV-D enforcement against JOSEPH C
1006 BLESSETT?

1007 **United States**

1008 The United States Congress entrusted an executive agency, the U.S. Department of
1009 Health and Human Services, to apply congressional legislation. Therefore, the U.S.
1010 Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for protecting the United States
1011 interest under Title IV of the Social Security Act block grants to states, payment for
1012 administrative services from a state agency, and the Act's application.

1013 The contracted state agencies application of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act under
1014 Cooperative-Federalism⁴⁹ has U.S. Constitutional issues in applying the U.S. Congress
1015 Act. Contracted entities have freely violated the U.S. Constitution to enforce the
1016 Congressional Act. Texas application of the Title IV-D of Social Security against the
1017 Plaintiff and its discriminatory laws against noncustodial parents is evidence of direct
1018 omissions of the Act's federal statutes and U.S. Constitution restrictions on state
1019 governments. U.S. Congress cannot remove individual immunities, personal liberties, and
1020 freedoms from the people to enact laws or constitutional amendments. The rot starts with
1021 the inadequate federal oversight of the individual state agencies' use of monies for

⁴⁹ **Bond v. US, 564 US 211 - Supreme Court 2011** Federalism has more than one dynamic. In allocating powers between the States and National Government, federalism "secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power," **New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120.** It enables States to enact positive law in response to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times, and it protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that law enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See **Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410.** Federalism's limitations are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. In a proper case, a litigant may challenge a law as enacted in contravention of federalism, just as injured individuals may challenge actions that transgress, e.g., separation-of-powers limitations, see, e.g., **INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317.** The claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a State's constitutional interests, even if those interests are also implicated. Pp. 2363-2366. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14974593486511807773&q=10th+amendment&hl=en&as_sdt=4,60

1022 enforcement activities and real-time application of federal statutes. Without following the
1023 promulgated Federal Statutes of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act for proper
1024 Procedural Law Process, the Title IV-D contracted agencies are dangerously close to or
1025 parallel to the prohibited activities listed in 18 U.S.C. 1962.⁵⁰ If the Texas lawmakers,
1026 OAG, and its contractors do not follow the federal statutes, they are outside their official
1027 capacity as Title IV-D enforcement agents. If the Texas OAG and its contractors follow
1028 the Title IV-D federal statutes contracted agents, they are outside their official capacity as
1029 state actors. The Texas Lawmakers must follow the U.S. Constitution regardless of Title
1030 IV-D of the Social Security Act under Cooperative-Federalism. Child support is not a
1031 particular type of debt that allows lawmakers to avoid the Supreme law of the land.

1032 No attorney or state judge has called into question the deviations from the U.S.
1033 Constitution in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in U.S District Court. There are
1034 apparent monetary reasons for not stopping the financial gravy train that Family Law has
1035 become. *Under 42 U.S.C. 666, the U.S. government imposes many intrusions of privacy*
1036 *and penalties on noncustodial parents without providing any equitable benefits or*
1037 *evidence of a criminal act.* Title IV-D is not a protected entitlement. It cannot be enforced
1038 like a protected entitlement. It is a one side adhesion contract that creates a monopoly in
1039 family law against private support contracts. The program provides inexpensive debt
1040 collection and enforcement services for custodial parents. However, it places an expensive
1041 financial burden on the noncustodial parent for personal legal services to defend against
1042 the abuses of a monopoly. The American Bar Association approved⁵¹ the program rules

⁵⁰ 18 U.S. Code § 1962 - Prohibited activities (b)It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

⁵¹ The *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) (Pub.L. 104-193)*, amended the Act by adding section 466(f), 42 U.S.C. 666(f), which mandated that all States have in effect by January 1, 1998, the *Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)* as approved by the American Bar Association on February 9, 1993, and as in effect on August 22, 1996, including any amendments officially adopted as of such date by the National

1043 that preserve protections for the state Title IV-D agencies and benefit private attorneys
1044 practicing family law with job security and a source of income.

1045 In contrast, the number of frivolous legal actions by the custodial parent would decrease
1046 the need for private attorneys and ease the financial burdens on the noncustodial parents to
1047 defend. Moreover, the plaintiff did not apply for the Title IV-D service or consent to the
1048 services. Yet, he is carrying the financial burden of protecting his rights against unlawful
1049 infringement from the program and protected state actors' abuses of a monopoly.

1050 Under 42 U.S.C. 658a, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services makes an
1051 incentive payment to each state title IV-D program for debt collection performance. There
1052 is no oversight into the state's increased financial dependence on federal grants. Instead,
1053 it's a wide-open bounty on child support debtors and the creation of new child support
1054 debtors Under 42 U.S.C. 658a. Title IV-D reimbursements, incentive payments, and Title
1055 IV-A federal grant is a considerable amount of money at stake, making the loss of these
1056 monies a threat to the states. 42 U.S.C. 658a is an inducement without the oversight of state
1057 enforcement action, and incentive payments are cash bounties for debtors. Just like the old
1058 wild west, enforcement by rewards leads to infringements of justice.

1059 U.S. Congress laid out federal statutes to offer some protections for the U.S.
1060 Constitution, such as 42 U.S.C. 654(12) protection. However, evidence of this civil action
1061 shows that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the agency responsible for
1062 oversight of the state agencies, has failed in its duties. Under 42 U.S.C. 654(31)(B)
1063 certification is used to certify Denial of Passport 42 U.S.C. 652(k), Xavier Becerra is

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). ***Federal Register***
<https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2010-15215>

42 U.S.C §666.(f) Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A)
of this title, each State must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved
by the American Bar Association on February 9, 1993, including any amendments officially
adopted as of September 30, 2008, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. ***United States Code, 2019 Edition, Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
WELFARE, CHAPTER 7 - SOCIAL SECURITY, SUBCHAPTER IV - GRANTS TO STATES
FOR AID AND SERVICES TO NEEDY FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN AND FOR CHILD-
WELFARE SERVICES***

1064 responsible for receiving the certified documentation against Blessett. The Department of
1065 Health and Human Services is responsible for reporting to the U.S. State Department and
1066 the U.S. Department of Treasury to legally enforce the federal statutes of Title IV of the
1067 Social Security Act. Defendants Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, Steven C McCall, and
1068 Anthony Blinkin listed in the civil action have been asked to provide evidence of Blessett's
1069 informed consent or the order modifying the original judicial order that confirms the debt.
1070 Under 42 U.S.C. 654(16), Xavier Becerra Gregg Abbott and Ken Paxton should be able
1071 to provide the required documents under 42 U.S.C. 654(12).

1072 Under the Texas IV-D agency's application of the Title IV-D program against Blessett
1073 was enforced by administrative act ignoring the U.S. Constitution restriction on state
1074 government. The Title IV-D Congressional Act has inadequate oversight and protection to
1075 prevent illegal activity against the people. The state Title IV-D agencies conceal that
1076 nothing in the U.S Constitution provides a right to financial support obligation to
1077 individuals, independent individuals, or government without a legal contract. The state
1078 Title IV-D agency's application of the Title IV-D services is deceptive in their approach to
1079 receiving consent from the nonprimary childcare parent. Although the nonprimary parent
1080 is not aware they are dealing with an administrative body in many cases, most settings give
1081 a judicial courtroom appearance. Therefore, it is a 15 U.S.C. § 1692e false and misleading
1082 representation⁵² of Title IV-D agencies. Title IV-D contract or agreement provides no
1083 benefits to the noncustodial parent. Under U.C.C., an agreement is only binding if the
1084 benefits are offered, or benefits are exercised.

1085 The U.S. Congressional debt collection legislation under Title IV-D discriminates
1086 against a specific class of debtors without political clout with unequal treatment under

⁵² 15 U.S.C. § 1692e False or misleading representations. A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof. (2) The false representation of (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.

1087 public law for interstate contracts and commerce. The Feminist⁵³ movement and LGBTQ⁵⁴
1088 community have considerable political influence. Heterosexual male groups⁵⁵ are
1089 described as hate groups, or heterosexual male complaints are myths.

1090 The document required under 42 U.S.C. 654(12) serves as evidence of compliance with
1091 federal contract terms. The document required under 42 U.S.C. 654(12) serves as evidence
1092 of compliance with U.S. Constitution restrictions on government. The state Title IV-D
1093 agency's failure to follow Title IV-D spending clause requirements of the Act violates due
1094 process. U.S. Congress intended Plaintiff as the beneficiary of 42 U.S.C. 654(12) imposing
1095 a binding obligation on the State. Instead, the Title IV-D agencies threaten to have the
1096 injured party imprisoned for not incriminating themselves by voluntarily disclosing personal
1097 information. Title IV-D agency suspended the injured party driver's license. Title IV-D
1098 agency has threatened to issue a warrant if the injured party did not voluntarily attend a
1099 nonjudicial administrative hearing. A biological heterosexual male acknowledgment of

⁵³ **The Wild Woman Project**, <https://thewildwomanproject.com/feminism-resources/>, **Association for Women in Psychology**, https://www.awpsych.org/feminist_resources.php, **Feminist Revolution**, <https://feminist-revolution.com/>

⁵⁴ **ACLU LEGISLATION AFFECTING LGBT RIGHTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY**, <https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbt-rights-across-country> , **Biden launches 'As You Are,' an LGBTQ family acceptance campaign**, <https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/biden-launches-you-are-lgbtq-family-acceptance-campaign-n898726>

⁵⁵ **VICE, This Group of Straight Men Is Swearing Off Women**, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/7bdwyx/inside-the-global-collective-of-straight-male-separatists> , **Wikipedia, The men's rights movement (MRM)**[1] is a branch of the men's movement. The MRM in particular consists of a variety of groups and individuals (men's rights activists or MRAs) who focus on general social issues and specific government services which adversely impact, or in some cases structurally discriminate against, men and boys. Common topics discussed within the men's rights movement include family law (such as child custody, alimony and marital property distribution), reproduction, suicides, domestic violence against men, circumcision, education, conscription, social safety nets, and health policies. The men's rights movement branched off from the men's liberation movement in the early 1970s, with both groups comprising a part of the larger men's movement. Many scholars describe the movement or parts of it as a backlash against feminism.[2] As part of the manosphere, the movement, and sectors of the movement, have been described by scholars and commentators as misogynistic,[3][4][5] hateful,[6][5][7] and, in some cases, as advocating violence against women.[5][8][9] In 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center categorized some men's rights groups as being part of a hate ideology under the umbrella of male supremacy while stating that others "focused on legitimate grievances".[10][11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Men%27s_rights_movement **Is There a Need for a Men's Rights Movement?** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKLFIsv7ATE>

1100 paternity is not a Title IV-D contractual obligation for financial support that can be
1101 defaulted.

1102 The Title IV-D programs conceal that it is not part of the judicial branch. Second, the
1103 state Title IV-D agencies present Title IV-D services as mandatory services without
1104 informing the nonprimary childcare parent of their right to decline the services. Concealing
1105 that nothing in the U.S. Congressional Act language addresses the nonprimary parent
1106 concerns or protection against illegal state government legal abuses. Instead, the Act forces
1107 the nonprimary parent to reallocate funds for legal protection against unlawful abuses
1108 under the color of law. Third, concealing that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act cannot
1109 be enforced without informed consent. Concealing that Title IV-D of the Social Security
1110 Act is a voluntary federal program requiring informed consent before enforcement of the
1111 U.S. Congressional Act. Fourth, concealing that under the U.S Constitution, restrictions on
1112 state government and the federal statutes within Title IV-D of the Social Security Act
1113 prevent the state Title IV-D agencies from abusing or defaulting a noncustodial parent into
1114 a contractual⁵⁶ financial obligation for refusal to participate in the program. Fourth, they
1115 are concealing that the nonprimary parent in divorce proceedings is under no obligation to
1116 incorporate Title IV-D services into their private contract. Concealing that state and federal
1117 support financial guidelines are just guidelines that may not infringe on private contract
1118 rights. Finally, they are concealing the fact that state and federal governments are not
1119 obligated to provide Title IV services. This civil action presents private, state and federal

⁵⁶ Federal Title IV-D contracts with the states falls under the legal doctrine of reverse incorporation. Whereas incorporation applies the Bill of Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in reverse incorporation, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause located in the Fifth Amendment For example, in **Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)**, which was a companion case to **Brown v. Board of Education**, the schools of the District of Columbia were desegregated even though Washington is a federal enclave. Likewise, in **Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña 515 U.S. 200 (1995)**, an affirmative action program by the federal government was subjected to strict scrutiny based on equal protection.

1120 actors who knowingly ignored U.S. Constitution restrictions on government and are liable
1121 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3)⁵⁷.

1122 These state Title IV-D programs are money-making federal to state, business to
1123 business enterprises. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act under Cooperative Federalism
1124 has created a monopoly in family law for interstate child support debt collection and
1125 enforcement as a government corporation, with satellite franchises under a 5 U.S.C. 101
1126 executive agency. Title IV-D is an interstate and foreign country commercial contract that
1127 extends beyond statutory time limits without any benefits and protections for the child
1128 support debtor. Without statutory time limits or alternatives to discharge the debt, the
1129 federal government creates indentured servants and slaves under Title IV-D. Therefore, it
1130 is a conflict with the 13th amendment for servitude absent a criminal act.

1131 Blessett served Ken Paxton, the acting Texas Attorney General, with a copy of a
1132 consumer complaint against Texas Attorney General Galveston County Child Support
1133 Enforcement Division by a third-party server delivered October 29, 2019, with a complaint
1134 about the illegal activity under the color of law. Ken Paxton, the acting Texas Attorney
1135 General, is a conflict of interest establishing U.S. Separation of Power issues and a restraint
1136 on the ability to protect service consumers equal 14th and 5th amendment protections for
1137 child support debtor's consumer abuses against the state Title IV-D agency. Ken Paxton,
1138 the acting Texas Attorney General, did not answer Blessett's consumer complaint file with
1139 his office.

⁵⁷ 42 U.S. Code § 1985(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; **Cornell Law School <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1985>**

1140 The application of the Act ignores biological heterosexual male private rights in
1141 domestic issues by imposing a contractual financial obligation⁵⁸ under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e
1142 deceptive practices. It all comes back to the decision in Roe v Wade woman's body, her
1143 choice without penalties for the consequences of recreational sex, and Obergefell v
1144 Hodges's homosexual relation same-sex marriage without government intrusion⁵⁹. These
1145 are all private matters protected by the decision made in Roe V. Wade, where the U.S.
1146 Supreme Court has found that several Amendments imply these rights:

- 1147 • First Amendment: Provides the freedom to choose any kind of religious belief
1148 and keep that choice private.
- 1149 • Third Amendment: Protects the zone of privacy of the home.
- 1150 • Fourth Amendment: Protects the right of privacy against unreasonable searches
1151 and seizures by the government.
- 1152 • Fifth Amendment: Provides for the right against self-incrimination, which
1153 justifies the protection of private information.
- 1154 • Ninth Amendment: This amendment is interpreted to justify a broad reading of
1155 the Bill of Rights to protect your fundamental right to privacy in ways not
1156 provided for in the first eight amendments.
- 1157 • Fourteenth Amendment: Prohibits states from making laws that infringe upon the
1158 personal autonomy protections provided for in the first thirteen amendments. Prior to
1159 the Fourteenth Amendment, a state could make laws that violated freedom of speech,
1160 religion, etc.

⁵⁸ The U.S. Supreme court has stated that Title IV-D is not an entitlement. It is the standard service a simple yardstick for the Secretary must look to the aggregated services provided by the State, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied. **Blessing V Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997)**

⁵⁹ adult, homosexual, individuals "are entitled to respect for their private lives," that the "State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime," and that "[t] heir right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, **Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F. 3d 853 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 2006**, In Lawrence, the Supreme Court plainly held that statutes criminalizing private acts of consensual sodomy between adults are inconsistent with the protections of liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. **MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F. 3d 154 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2013**, Roe recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person. **Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 - Supreme Court 2003**

1161 The Family Courts and public opinion tend to entertain arguments about the custodial
1162 parent and children's emotional personal rights, excluding the commerce law rights and the
1163 laws prohibiting government infringement⁶⁰ on biological heterosexual male private rights.
1164 State law or an executive branch agency cannot deny biological heterosexual males private
1165 equal rights for the consequences of recreation sex and impose religious morality. It is not
1166 law or protected public rights. The biological heterosexual male equal gender rights,
1167 religious beliefs, and rights to contract are covered under public law, Title VII of the Civil
1168 Rights Act of 1964. The biological heterosexual male commerce clause and contract clause
1169 protection prevent forcible government infringement or forced government enforcement of
1170 a financial obligation. Biological Females have many methods of contraception⁶¹ and the
1171 right to abort the consequence of recreation sex. Blessett contends that Title IV-D is biased
1172 to create child support debtors and willful neglect of public law restrictions on government
1173 infringement on commerce law protections. Title IV-D is biased against child support
1174 debtors extends to the dismissal of public law immunities and equal protection among the
1175 gender right to abort the consequence of recreational sex. Noncontractual sex is
1176 recreational sex without a promise of financial support or obligation of duty to the
1177 consequences of a woman's private choice.

⁶⁰ Federal Title IV-D contracts with the states falls under the legal doctrine of reverse incorporation. Whereas incorporation applies the Bill of Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in reverse incorporation, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause located in the Fifth Amendment For example, in **Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)**, which was a companion case to *Brown v. Board of Education*, the schools of the District of Columbia were desegregated even though Washington is a federal enclave. Likewise, in **Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña 515 U.S. 200 (1995)**, an affirmative action program by the federal government was subjected to strict scrutiny based on equal protection.

⁶¹ Injectable birth control, Progestin-only pills (POPs), Combined oral contraceptives (COCs, "the pill"), Contraceptive patch, Vaginal ring, Female condoms, Contraceptive sponges, Spermicides, Diaphragms, Cervical caps, Copper IUD, Emergency contraceptive pills (ECPs), sterilization implant, Tubal ligation and aborting the fetus. What are the different types of contraception? | NICHD - **Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (nih.gov),<https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/contraception/conditioninfo/types>**, **<https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/index.htm>**,

1178 Biological heterosexual males are not required by law or a protected private right to
1179 accept the consequences of recreational sex or Title IV-D obligation. It is gender
1180 discrimination if religious morality standards are only applied to straight males for the
1181 consequences of recreational sex. Unwed mothers with illegitimate children have no right
1182 to the father's income without a contract.⁶² Personal religious morality is not a legal
1183 defense or an entitlement to a financial obligation support order. Personal religious
1184 morality is not a legal defense for state and federal actors performing acts under the color
1185 of law to enforce Title IV-D administrative support orders without consent or due process.

⁶² See Wehunt v Ledbetter, mothers of children with absent fathers brought suit under § 1983 against the Georgia Department of Health and Human Services for its failure to establish the paternity of their children and secure child support on their behalf; The Eleventh Circuit held that "Title IV-D does not create enforceable rights on behalf of needy families with children because they are not the intended beneficiaries of the statute." The court reasoned that the primary purpose of Title IV-D was to recoup the state's welfare expenditures on behalf of needy families by collecting child support from absent parents. While the AFDC program itself was intended to benefit needy families with children, Title IV-D was designed to benefit the public treasury and taxpayers by reducing the present and future welfare rolls. "The court pointed to the legislative history of Title IV-D."

See Wilder, 496 US at 509-10, quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v Los Angeles, 493 US 103, 106 (1989). Id at 510. The Court in Golden State suggested in dictum that a statute does not create enforceable rights if the benefit to the plaintiffs is merely incidental 493 US at 109. Even if the Court were to adopt such an exception to the enforceable rights analysis, it would not affect the determination of whether Title IV-D creates enforceable rights on behalf of needy families with children.

See Blessing, supra, 520 U.S. at 343, 117 S. Ct. at 1361, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 584. The United States Supreme Court found defendant's action did not assert a violation of a federal right. "The requirement that a State operates its child support program in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right. Far from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure a State's Title IV-D program's systemwide performance. Thus, the Secretary must look to the State's aggregate services, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied. Carelli v Howser, the Sixth Circuit Court noted, "Title IV-D establish an elaborate system for providing mandated services, recapturing funds, meeting performance indicators, and auditing state compliance." Id at 1565, "the goal of Title IV-D was to lower the cost to the taxpayer immediately as well as to lessen the number of families enrolling in welfare in the future-benefits to society as a whole rather than specific individuals." Id. at 345, 117 S. Ct. at 1362, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 585. While the Court did "not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual rights," it emphasized that plaintiffs must be able to "identify with particularity the rights they claimed

1186 Personal religious beliefs are not a legal defense, personal religious beliefs are individual
1187 protected rights to worship as you please without government infringement.

1188 1. Admit or deny the 42U.S.C. 654(3) State agency is not entitled to administrative
1189 reimbursement for misrepresented or fraudulent services provided to noncustodial
1190 parents under fraud?

1191 2. Admit or deny there is no difference between fraudulent Medicare billing for
1192 services and fraudulent Title IV-D billing for services?

1193 3. Admit or deny Title IV-D program is not a U.S. Government protected entitlement
1194 for illegitimate children born out of wedlock?

1195 4. Admit or deny the U.S. Constitution does not provide entitlements of the biological
1196 father's assets to children born out of wedlock?

1197 5. Admit or Deny Title IV-D can only be enforced through informed consent of
1198 contractual agreement?

1199 6. Admit or deny that federal statute, federal codes, and state laws provide no forcible
1200 legal remedies for the consequences of recreational sex for unwed mothers without
1201 the biological father's consent to a contract?

1202 7. Admit or Deny that the non-primary parent is not informed that they have the right
1203 to decline the voluntary Title IV-D services?

1204 8. Admit or deny failure to disclose the right to decline a Title IV-D contract to the
1205 noncustodial parent is a misrepresentation of a contract?

1206 9. Admit or Deny that the Title IV-D programs offer nothing of equitable value to the
1207 noncustodial parent?

1208 10. Admit or deny Denial of Passport 42 U.S.C. 652(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 666 as
1209 extremely affordable debt collection tools the U.S. Government provides are unfair,
1210 deceptive acts⁶³ as debt collection services, practices, and methods affecting
1211 commerce as a financial burden on noncustodial parents?

⁶³ 15 U.S.C. § 45 - Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission, (a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inapplicability to foreign trade

- 1212 11. Admit or deny Denial of Passport 42 U.S.C. 652(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 666 debt
1213 collection tools are incredibly affordable debt collection services affecting
1214 competition?
- 1215 12. Admit or deny Denial of Passport 42 U.S.C. 652(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 666 are
1216 incredibly affordable debt collection tools that induce custodial parents to assign
1217 payable account rights to the state agencies?
- 1218 13. Admit or deny 42 U.S.C. 658a is an inducement to discourage⁶⁴ state actors from
1219 enforcing private child support contracts in favor of Title IV-D child support
1220 contracts?
- 1221 14. Admit or deny Title IV-D of the Social Security Act provisions are indirect
1222 discrimination⁶⁵ only against child support debtors?
- 1223 15. Admit or deny the deadbeat moniker is implicit bias, established in the H.R.
1224 Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 signed by President Bill Clinton?
- 1225 16. Admit or deny that the state or federal government cannot write or enforce a law
1226 that violates the U.S. Constitution to force financial support for the consequences of
1227 recreational sex?

1228

City of Galveston

1229 Texas Local Government Code Title 3 **Sec. 87.012** gives the Municipality or any
1230 citizen the power to remove from office for a county judge, constable, district clerk, or
1231 sheriff for gross ignorance of official duties or unlawful behavior relating to official duties
1232 by an officer entrusted with the administration of justice or the execution of the law.

1233 The CITY OF GALVESTON has the responsibility and obligation presented in 45 CFR
1234 § 303.107 requirements for cooperative arrangements to enforce Title IV-D. The City of

(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.

⁶⁵ Indirect Discrimination (1923) Discrimination arising from the application of a provision, criterion, or policy in such a way that a particular definable group is disadvantaged. **Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edition**

1235 Galveston employees were required to operate under the policies of Title IV-D to follow
1236 the contractual agreement requirements to safeguard against infringement of noncustodial
1237 parent's rights. Unfortunately, not all the Title IV-D contracted agents or employees in the
1238 CITY OF GALVESTON followed the Title IV-D contractual requirement to preserve the
1239 Plaintiff's rights. At 2:18 pm on October 22, 1999, Cynthia Brown-Sayko, and Assistant
1240 Attorney General of the Child Support Division Texas Bar No. 00793042 entered a "Notice
1241 of Change of Payee" from the Galveston County District Clerk's Office, Evelyn Wells
1242 Robison, 722 Moody, 4th Floor, Galveston Texas 77550 to file a change of payee to the
1243 Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 13499, Austin Texas 78711. The change of payee
1244 is an administrative action without a judicial modification to the primary lender Joe
1245 Blessett's original support order or Joe Blessett's consent. It was done by a City of
1246 Galveston representative and an OAG agent in 1999.

1247 Blessett has firsthand knowledge that he did not receive service of notice in 2015. Yet,
1248 an associate judge confirmed an Order for Support Arrearage without proof of service
1249 under Texas Rules of Civil Procedures before a hearing. The omission of the civil
1250 procedural rules before a hearing is a nonjudicial act and covering up or hiding this fact is
1251 a nonjudicial act. Blessett has firsthand knowledge that he did not consent to a change of
1252 Payee to the OAG or receive the required notice for hearings to complete Rule 107(h)⁶⁶ in
1253 the *Texas Rules of Civil Procedures*. The CITY OF GALVESTON must exercise its rights
1254 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 to properly present the evidence, facts, and law
1255 relating to the question of constitutionality as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.

1256 Barbara Roberts declined the opportunity to correct an infringement on Blessett's
1257 rights. In one instance, Roberts subjugated Blessett and proceeded to act as his legal
1258 counsel without his knowledge or consent to reinstate his petition on May 24, 2017, which
1259 she dismissed on May 19, 2017. Roberts's acting as legal counsel to make decisions for

⁶⁶ Rule 107 - No default judgment shall be granted in any cause until proof of service as provided by this rule or by Rules 108 or 108a, or as ordered by the court in the event citation is executed by an alternative method under Rule 106, shall have been on file with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment.

1260 Blessett placed her outside of her official capacity as a judge and a Texas judicial
1261 representative. Roberts assumes the duties of a private attorney for Blessett. She was
1262 putting Blessett at a disadvantage instead of reversing the roles of the petitioner and
1263 defendant. The burden of proof should have shifted to Sinkin Law Firm as the petitioners
1264 to proceed against Blessett as the defendant. At that moment, Barbara Roberts “oversteps”
1265 the role of adjudicating the case as a Judge based on the arguments and presented a petition
1266 on behalf of JOSEPH C BLESSETT on May 24, 2017. On November 27, 2017, warned
1267 Roberts that any averment of U.S. Constitution removes any presumption of judicial or
1268 qualified immunity under the 11th amendment and shall be held personally for damages.
1269 It is a clear indication that Roberts had no intentions of following Texas Rules of Civil
1270 Procedure for filing a petition and service of notice. Cynthia Brown-Sayko, Evelyn Wells
1271 Robison, and Roberts's behavior are examples⁶⁷ of routine activity in the CITY OF
1272 GALVESTON Family Law. We are not asking the court to review and reject a state court
1273 ruling. Instead, we ask the court to review the accused's conduct before a state court
1274 judgment that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not bar. **See *Truong v. Bank of Am.,***
1275 **N.A., 717 F.3d 377 , 382-84 (5th Cir. 2013).**

1276 *Under Title IV-D federal code 45 CFR § 303.107 - Requirements for cooperative*
1277 *arrangements. The State must ensure that all cooperative arrangements: (a) Contain a*
1278 *clear description of the specific duties, functions, and responsibilities of each party. The*
1279 *parties involved had or should have had explicit knowledge of Title IV-D statutes and Texas*
1280 *Rules of Civil Procedures.*

1281

1282 1. Admit or deny that the City of Galveston has the power to remove from office for a
1283 county judge, constable, district clerk, or sheriff for gross ignorance of official
1284 duties or unlawful behavior relating to official duties by an officer entrusted with
1285 the administration of justice or the execution of the law?

⁶⁷ Rule 9(e) Pleading Special Matters, (e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or a board or officer, it suffices to plead the judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to render it.

- 1286 2. Admit or deny that the City of Galveston court clerk office public records cannot
1287 produce material evidence as per Texas Rules of Civil Procedures return of service
1288 Rule 107(h)⁶⁸ for any notice to Blessett before a hearing?
- 1289 3. Admit or deny that an Administrating Judge stated in an order that Blessett failed
1290 to show after being duly notified?
- 1291 4. Admit or deny that an Administrating Judge committed perjury in signing a state
1292 court order, a legal document attesting to proof of service to JOSEPH C
1293 BLESSETT?
- 1294 5. Admit or deny Barbara E Roberts failed to follow Rule 107(h) before hearing
1295 against Blessett's protected Texas homestead exempt property?
- 1296 6. Admit or deny Barbara E Roberts May 24, 2017, reinstatement of Blessett's petition
1297 without his consent is outside of her capacity as a judge?
- 1298 7. Admit or deny the CITY OF GALVESTON is in a cooperative arrangement with
1299 the OAG for child support enforcement?
- 1300 8. Admit or deny there is a constitutional minimum; the due process requires to notice
1301 reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
1302 the pendency of the action and allow them to present their objections?

1303 **Sinkin Law Firm**

1304 It is a conclusive presumption dictated by existing legal principles of implicit and
1305 explicit knowledge that existing Texas homestead exemptions are protected by procedural
1306 and substantive law. The Defendants knew the Plaintiff's property in question was exempt
1307 from child support liens. Yet, Defendant used a state court to assist their client in breaching
1308 a private contract, ignoring state codes and civil procedures to protect private rights from
1309 illegal infringement.

⁶⁸ Rule 107 - No default judgment shall be granted in any cause until proof of service as provided by this rule or by Rules 108 or 108a, or as ordered by the court in the event citation is executed by an alternative method under Rule 106, shall have been on file with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment.

1310 The defendant is charged with using modern 21st century Jim Crow color of law actions
1311 against Blessett to deny and infringe on his 4th, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendment rights. The
1312 21st century Jim Crow, illegally relieving Blessett of his protected Texas Homestead
1313 exempt property through legal maneuvers under the unlawful color of law, is the 1964 Civil
1314 rights act to bring about social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races
1315 in the Southern states. A person needn't do anything to be victimized in this manner. If a
1316 White person simply didn't like the look of a Black person, they could lose everything,
1317 including their life. Under the 4th amendment, Blessett was under no obligation to prove
1318 his homestead status. Instead, the onerous was placed on Sinkin Law Firm to demonstrate
1319 the capacity to show legally binding rights to the property. Plaintiff is attacking Defendant's
1320 legal conduct before a judgment under the color of law to obtain the property and failure
1321 to provide credit for a thing of value or exchange a something of value in exchange for a
1322 thing of value.

1323 Nick Perez, staff attorney for the Galveston Central Appraisal District, responded to the
1324 legal notice by email supplied in the notice by Blessett. Nick Perez provided an answer for
1325 Norman B. Franzke of the Galveston Central Appraisal District concerning the exemption
1326 status of the property Blessett's property ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 – 2515 Merrimac,
1327 League City, TX 77573. The property retained its exemption status until the transfer date.

1328 Defendants had no legal standing to place an encumbrance of Blessett's property on
1329 May 12, 2017. Stett Jacoby submitted a signed affidavit affirming himself as an attorney
1330 with Sinkin Law firm. The defendant cannot claim they were acting in good faith on May
1331 12, 2017, knowing Blessett's existing private contracts and the claim of homestead
1332 exemption status. The subrogation of the Creditors' rights in equity cannot be displaced
1333 without a contract or judicial instrument. Equity requires a legal promise to correct a defect
1334 in equity. The defendants failed to follow commerce's equitable laws in placing an
1335 encumbrance on the property without a negotiable instrument to offset the Plaintiff's equity
1336 and ownership on May 12, 2017, depriving the Plaintiff of the monetary value in his
1337 property. Sinkin Law Firm did not file a petition in a state court listing the property located

1338 at 2515 Merrimac, League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing before
1339 May 12, 2017, as a thing to be transferred to satisfy a monetary debt. The terms of Blessett's
1340 July 23, 1999, Final Divorce Decree contract clearly list the arrearage and the penalties.
1341 Sinkin Law Firm client did not have a legal instrument for a lien naming the property
1342 located at 2515 Merrimac, League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing
1343 before May 12, 2017. Sinkin Law Firm did not act in good faith; Sinkin Law Firm had an
1344 obligation to follow Texas property codes, U.S. 5th Circuit Court precedents, and honor
1345 U.S. Constitution property rights.

1346 Illegal acts under the Color of Law include actions within and beyond the bounds or
1347 limits of lawful authority, including private actors. Under Texas Property rights for
1348 homestead exemption status and substantive law, has to be evidence of contractual
1349 obligations with a mortgage company or repair contractor that directly jeopardized
1350 Blessett's property ownership.

1351 Sinkin Law Firm nor Barbara E Roberts can deny the Galveston County Court at Law
1352 N0.2 order signed on May 24, 2017. The firm was instructed to notice Blessett for a
1353 conference scheduled for June 8, 2017. The state exemption protection under state
1354 procedural law and substantive law would require full process service of notice with the
1355 opportunity to defend a protected property. Roberts knew this, which is why it was written
1356 into the orders. The law firms and attorneys should know or should have known under laws
1357 of equity, Blessett's divorce contract, and the property's established homestead character
1358 are protected from illegal infringement. It is a well-understood expectation that homestead
1359 rights are not easily lost once gained. *"The only way for property to lose its homestead after*
1360 *it has been dedicated as a homestead is by death, abandonment or alienation."* **Garrard v.**
1361 **Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1948, no writ)** *To interpret state*
1362 *homestead rights, this Court must, of course, look to state law. **See In re Moody, 77 B.R.***
1363 **580, 590 (S.D.Tex.1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir.1989)** *In Texas, the state*
1364 *constitution and statutes have clearly established homestead exemption rights as a unique*
1365 *enclave to protect an individual's possession and enjoyment in property which is used as*

1366 *his or her home. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 686, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 2138, 76*
1367 *L.Ed.2d 236 (1983); In re Claflin, 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir.1985); see generally McKnight,*
1368 *Homestead: Designation and Extent, 36 Sw.L.J. 121 (1982). The homestead right is not*
1369 *a mere statutory entitlement, but a vested property right. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d*
1370 *867 (Tex.1978). Once the claimant has established the homestead character of her*
1371 *property, the burden shifts to the creditor to disprove the continued existence of the*
1372 *homestead. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex.1971); Lifemark Corp.,*
1373 *655 S.W.2d at 314.8 The defendants attached the property through unlawful activities.*

1374 There is no evidence of a state court modification of the Divorce contract order or
1375 the Plaintiff's loss of Texas homestead privileges. There is evidence of skipping the steps
1376 required to protect Blessett's rights against infringement and deprivation of those rights.
1377 The Contract Clause provides that no state may pass a *Law impairing the Obligation of*
1378 *Contracts, and a law in this context may be a statute, constitutional provision,⁶⁹ municipal*
1379 *ordinance,⁷⁰ or administrative regulation having the force and operation of a statute.⁷¹*
1380 The Constitution "is the supreme law of the land for the people of the United States,
1381 aggregately and in their separate sovereignties. The people have excluded themselves from
1382 any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They have
1383 directed the servants that amendments should be made representatively for the people's
1384 benefit. No state or federal law or policy may violate the supreme law of the land for the
1385 people of the United States. Defendant's activities in this civil action are evidence of
1386 unlawful conduct. It is evident that Defendant ignored the state laws, uniform commerce

⁶⁹ Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856); Ohio & M. R.R. v. McClure, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511 (1871); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885); Bier v. McGehee, 148 U.S. 137, 140 (1893)

⁷⁰ New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898); City of Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914); Cuyahoga Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916).

⁷¹ A legislative act by an instrumentality of the State exercising delegated authority is of the same force as if made by the legislature and is a law of the State within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Indiana R.R. Comm'n, 221 U.S. 400 (1911); Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926)

1387 clause protections for private contracts and deliberately defied the U.S. Constitution.
1388 Plaintiff acknowledges that unprotected assets required no notice under summary judgment
1389 enforcement. The results explain the deceptive legal maneuvers to acquire the protected
1390 asset by declaring the asset unprotected by the Texas homestead exemption without
1391 providing sufficient notice to defend it.

1392 Evidence shows Sinkin Law Firm did not forward the proceeds from the auction of
1393 Blessett's property as child support payments to Texas Child Support State Distribution
1394 Unit (SSD) at P.O. Box 659791, San Antonio, Texas 78265-9791 to credit JOSEPH
1395 CRAIG BLESSETT as ordered by Galveston County Court at Law #2 as per the instruction
1396 of the summary judgment orders. Therefore, the evidence presented in the OAG Child
1397 Support Division Financial Activity report as of June 18, 2020, no collection was recorded
1398 for \$65,000.00 sixty-five thousand dollars.

1399 The evidence presented in the purchase receipt shows the completion of the sale is
1400 plausible evidence of the attorney's intent to enrich themselves by taking advantage of their
1401 client, a single mother's lack of knowledge of the law, and test the Plaintiff's intelligence.
1402 Furthermore, the defendant may have been racially motivated because of the Plaintiff's
1403 ethnicity. Additionally, bypassing the OAG and SSD allowed the Defendants to take
1404 immediate control of the property, satisfy their client, and subtract their legal fees without
1405 giving Plaintiff credit for the full \$65,000.00 sixty-five thousand dollars.

1406 The Defendants conduct is questionable as an illegal activity by issued contradicting
1407 affidavit on May 12, 2017, to nonjudicial government bodies to prevent plaintiff
1408 conveyance of property before a judicial order. The action demonstrates the possession of
1409 Plaintiff's property through unlawful administrative maneuvers. Stett M Jacoby placed a
1410 personal property lien on Blessett's protected property without a judicial order.
1411 Additionally, Stett M Jacoby committed 18 U.S.C. § 1623⁷² perjury, stating he froze the

⁷² 18 U.S.C. § 1623 - False declarations before the court, (a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or

1412 property pending litigation. Stett M Jacoby submitted an affidavit to U.S. District Court for
1413 the Southern District of Texas in JOE BLESSETT v. BEVERLY ANN GARCIA, 3:18-CV-
1414 00137 United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division **“he froze the**
1415 **Plaintiff’s property pending a lawsuit that did not exist.** “

1416 Without a receipt of legal instrument value for the exchange of Blessett property,
1417 Defendant has committed a white-collar crime and prevented Plaintiff's ability to secure
1418 credit for the property. The defendant had a fiduciary obligation to Plaintiff to present a
1419 legal, financial instrument representing the property's value—"*valued property for more*
1420 *than \$30,000 thirty thousand dollars under Chapter 32 of the Texas Penal Code.* “⁷³ The
1421 property secured an alleged debt, and the receipt for the sale is an item of value as a legal
1422 instrument exchanged under the laws of equity.

- 1423
- 1424 1. Admit or deny that Stett M Jacoby, acting agent for Sinkin Law Firm, submitted an
1425 affidavit to the Galveston County Clerk public records?
 - 1426 2. Admit or deny that Sinkin Law Firm did not have pending litigation naming the
1427 property located at 2515 Merrimac, League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47
1428 BLK 10 The Landing before or on May 12, 2017?
 - 1429 3. Admit or deny that Sinkin Law Firm acting agent Stett M Jacoby submitted an
1430 affidavit to a federal court attesting to pending litigation naming the property located
1431 at 2515 Merrimac, League City, Texas ABST 9 Page 3 Lot 47 BLK 10 The Landing
1432 before or on May 12, 2017?

grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

⁷³ Chapter 32 of the Texas Penal Code defines offenses relating to fraud. “Misapplication of Fiduciary Property or Property of Financial Institution,” as per § 32.45 of the Texas Penal Code, occurs when a person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misapplies property he holds as a fiduciary or property of a financial institution in a manner that involves substantial risk of loss to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property is held. An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the value of the property misapplied is \$30,000 or more but less than \$150,000.

- 1433 4. Admit or deny that Sinkin Law Firm, Sinkin & Barretto purchased the property
1434 located at auction?
- 1435 5. Admit or deny Sinkin Law Firm did not forward the proceeds from the auction of
1436 Blessett's property as child support payments to Texas Child Support State
1437 Distribution Unit at P.O. Box 659791, San Antonio, Texas 78265-9791 to credit
1438 JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT as ordered by Galveston County Court at Law #2 as
1439 per the instruction of the judgment?
- 1440 6. Admit or deny the Attorney General of Texas Child Support State Distribution Unit
1441 financial report as of June 6, 2020, does not show a credit for sixty-five thousand
1442 dollars (\$65,000.00) for JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT?
- 1443 7. Admit or deny Sinkin Law Firm did not present Blessett with an instrument of value,
1444 a receipt in exchange for his property?
- 1445 8. Admit or deny that Plaintiff is an African American, a black man?

1446 **Summary**

1447 We the People are the first three words in the U.S. Constitution, and somehow the words
1448 have been misplaced. In the U.S Constitution, “We the People” grant public servants the
1449 right to uphold the words within the document and the U.S. Congress to amend the
1450 document to improve the foundational concept of the document for the people. Article I,
1451 Section 10 of the Constitution limits the states’ powers by prohibiting them from granting
1452 nobility titles, printing their own currency, or interfering with uniform foreign and
1453 interstate commerce. The people gave the U.S. Congress the right to impose Title IV-D of
1454 the Social Security Act. Unfortunately, in their misplaced wisdom, they granted their power
1455 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to oversee the Act. The evidence
1456 presented in this civil action shows the agency has failed in its responsibility to the People’s
1457 document the United States Constitution.

1458 As it stands now, the State of Texas Title IV-D agency policies and remote operations
1459 are cloaked in layers of protections through deniable plausibility of responsibility from the
1460 liabilities of their actions. The State actors are given titles of nobility if they can receive all

1461 benefits of nobility, cloaked from prosecution for illegal activities. The current Texas Title
1462 IV-D operation places a high financial burden on the child support debtor to follow the
1463 paper trail to find the responsible state actors with professional legal assistance.

1464 Under 42 U.S.C. 654(12), Ken Paxton's office had a duty to present Plaintiff with a
1465 copy of the judicial orders for modification or proof of Plaintiff's consent to the Title IV-
1466 D program. The OAG failed to deliver a legal instrument of equal value JOSEPH CRAIG
1467 BLESSETT to setoff his legal instrument within a reasonable time. Therefore, a certified
1468 legal instrument of authority was required. Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, Steven C McCall,
1469 Xavier Becerra, and Anthony Blinkin were given considerations presented in a notice. The
1470 failure to meet Blessett's legal notice provides grounds in equity and at law for their
1471 implicit and explicit conduct and failure to comply with mandatory federal statutes.

1472

Argument

1473

1474

1475 " JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT cannot be bound to a contract that he has not made or
1476 authorized. Free consent is an indispensable element in making valid contracts." Blessett
1477 may stand upon "his Constitutional Rights" as a private individual. He is entitled to carry
1478 on his "private" business in his own way. "His power to contract is unlimited." He owes no
1479 duty to the State or his neighbors to divulge his business or to open his doors to an
1480 investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State since
1481 he receives nothing from there, beyond the protection of his life and property. "His rights"
1482 are such as "existed" by the Law of the Land (Common Law) "long antecedent" to the
1483 organization of the State," and can only be taken from him by "due process of law," and
1484 "under the Constitution." "He owes nothing" to the public so long as he does not trespass
1485 upon their rights." **Quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)** were the 13th, and
1486 14th Amendments banned slavery without the conviction of a crime and required the states
1487 to provide all people equal protection of the laws after overturning U.S. Supreme Court
1488 earlier ruling.

1489 "Since every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the
1490 mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary,
1491 having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity
1492 with the tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law,
1493 agency, aspect, court, etc., can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial
1494 persons and the contracts between them." Quoting **U.S. v Minker, 350 US 179 at**
1495 **187(1956)** As the Real Party of Interest over JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT, Joe Blessett's
1496 artificial person or any variations of the name has not entered into a Title IV-D financial
1497 obligation contract with any of the individual persons, corporate entities, unrepresented
1498 parties, and artificial parties referenced or named in this legal instrument.

1499 The U.S. Congress, with the U.S. Supreme Courts' support, intended for the federal
1500 lower courts to follow the federal statutes of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, with
1501 the “*Spending Clause of the Title IV programs to protecting the U.S. Government interest.*
1502 The “*Commerce Clause*” and “*Contract Clause*” are UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
1503 protections that prevent injuries to Blessett from the liable contracted agencies in their
1504 failure to meet the contractual terms of Title IV of the Social Security Act promulgated
1505 federal statutes. ⁷⁴The unlawful collection and enforcement by a Texas contracted Title IV-
1506 D agency is an infringement on protected inalienable rights under the color of law.
1507 *Blessett's injuries are entitled to a remedy Quoting Marbury v. Madison. If the State*
1508 *cannot enact or perform any laws that infringe on civil rights or private legal contracts,*
1509 *the law favors Blessett.* The Defendants enforce invalid debt collection services against
1510 Plaintiff. Likewise, the Supreme Court struck down a **New York** law setting maximum
1511 hours for bakery employees on the ground that it violated the right of contract, as protected
1512 by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. *Citing - Lochner v. New York, 198*
1513 *U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905),* for the enforcement of invalid monetary
1514 obligation. Blessett has enforceable rights under the "Contract Clause Article I, section 10,
1515 clause1," "Commerce Clause," 5th and 14th Amendments. Supreme Court has "*held for*
1516 *many years (logically or not) that the 'liberties' protected by Substantive Due Process do*
1517 *not include economic liberties.*" *Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of*
1518 *Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 721, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010) (citing Lincoln*
1519 *Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536, 69 S.Ct. 251,*
1520 *93 L.Ed. 212 (1949)); cf. Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 481-83 (D.C.Cir.2012)*
1521 During the Lochner era, the Court considered the right to contract and other economic

⁷⁴ The Commerce Clause, provision of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8) serves a two-fold purpose: it is the direct source of the most important powers that the Federal Government exercises in peacetime, and, except for the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the most important limitation imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of state power. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, known as the Contract Clause, imposes certain prohibitions on the states. The Contract Clause recognizes people's right to form contracts.

1522 liberties to be fundamental requirements of due process of law, and the constitution is not
1523 intended to embody a particular economic theory. The U.S. Constitution is fundamentally
1524 in favor of the people’s rights. No one can take unlawful economic liberties to collect a
1525 debt or enforce a contract. Lochner and the OAG enforced contracts in contradiction to
1526 public policy.

1527 Blessett’s arguments established prohibited activities of the defendants for forced
1528 compliance to contractual terms for a contract that requires laborers or services to benefit
1529 another from an Act enacted by the U.S. Congress that violates the U.S. Constitution. It is
1530 a simulation of Jim Crow discrimination based on debt under the color of law. The
1531 allowance of non-compliance of the Title IV-D federal statutes creates an elite government
1532 social class from the U.S. District of Columbia abusing federal legislation in a manner that
1533 is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution's judicial adherence. An elite government social class
1534 as the Master of Human behavior and consequence of private personal choices that violate
1535 the alienable rights of the natural person.

1536 Plaintiff has every expectation of receiving uniform Commerce Clause protection for
1537 his contract and property. It is a conclusive presumption that Defendant was exercising
1538 Title IV-D contract terms. The defendants were bound by U.S. Congress legislative terms⁷⁵
1539 of their contract with the U.S. Government, Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), federal
1540 statutes, and public law. Defendants Gregg Abbott, Steven C McCall, Xavier Becerra,
1541 Anthony Blinkin, Ken Paxton, and his subordinates actively enforced U.S. Congressional
1542 Act in this civil action and are liable for their actions. United States v. Seckinger⁷⁶

⁷⁵ When interpreting legislation, our role “is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good policy.’” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218 (2014) (alteration in original)(quoting Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996)).

⁷⁶ Federal law controls the interpretation of a contract entered pursuant to federal law when the United States is a party. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209-10, 90 S.Ct. 880, 884-85, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970) (Seckinger) Federal law controls the interpretation of the contract. See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174, 183 (1944);[12] Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943). This conclusion results from the fact that the contract was entered into pursuant to authority conferred by federal statute and, ultimately, by the Constitution. United States v. Seckinger, 397 US 203 - Supreme Court 1970

1543 State actors are restricted to state laws and the authority covered under state
1544 sovereignty. The U.S. Constitution's "Separation of Power" and the "Supremacy Clause"
1545 places federal programs administered by state actors outside of their state official capacity.
1546 *The state actors act under the color of law unless they can provide legal documentation*
1547 *that **Blessett** agreed to this arrangement.* A state court judge or the Texas Attorney General
1548 cannot be an officer for Texas and simultaneously serve as a federal actor, agent, or
1549 administrator. Ken Paxton cannot service a federal contract administrator simultaneously
1550 as state actors.

1551 Under 45 CFR § 303.20, the state organizational structure of the IV-D agency provides
1552 for administration or supervision of all the functions for which it is responsible under the
1553 State plan, with appropriate size and scope of the program in the State and contains
1554 established lines for the administrative and supervisory authority.⁷⁷ All evidence shows
1555 Ken Paxton cannot enforce the Title IV-D program against Plaintiff. See *Richardson v.*
1556 *Dep't of Interior, 740 F.Supp. 15, 19-20 (D.D.C.1990)* (holding that the Plaintiff could
1557 not bring a section 1983 claim against a federal official who arrested the Plaintiff under
1558 the federal Assimilative Crimes Act, which provides that D.C. law can be applied on federal
1559 property as though it is federal law); *Townsend v. Carmel, 494 F.Supp. 30, 32*
1560 *(D.D.C.1979)* (same). Applying a similar analysis, the Second Circuit permitted a section
1561 1983 suit to go forward against federal officials who allegedly conspired with state officials
1562 to violate the Plaintiff's federal rights. *Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448-49 (2d*

⁷⁷ **45 CFR § 303.107** - Requirements for cooperative arrangements. The State must ensure that all cooperative arrangements: (a) Contain a clear description of the specific duties, functions and responsibilities of each party; (b) Specify clear and definite standards of performance which meet Federal requirements; (c) Specify that the parties will comply with title IV-D of the Act, implementing Federal regulations and any other applicable Federal regulations and requirements; (d) Specify the financial arrangements including budget estimates, covered expenditures, methods of determining costs, procedures for billing the IV-D agency, and any relevant Federal and State reimbursement requirements and limitations; (e) Specify the kind of records that must be maintained and the appropriate Federal, State and local reporting and safeguarding requirements; and (f) Specify the dates on which the arrangement begins and ends, any conditions for revision or renewal, and the circumstances under which the arrangement may be terminated.

1563 *Cir.1969*); *cf. Johnson v. Orr, 780 F.2d 386, 390-93 (3d Cir.1986)* (holding that the
1564 Plaintiff could sue certain Air National Guard officials under section 1983 since New
1565 Jersey's significant control over these officials meant they were state actors); *Tongol v.*
1566 *Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir.1979)* (concluding that a section 1983 action was
1567 appropriate against state officials administering a federally funded program since these
1568 officials were "empowered to act only by virtue of their authority under state law").
1569 Blessett's injuries are entitled to a remedy *Quoting Marbury v. Madison*⁷⁸ for the
1570 defendant administering a federally funded program and the fact that the State or U.S.
1571 Congress cannot enact or perform any laws that infringe on civil rights or right to a private
1572 legal contract.

1573 Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, and Xavier Becerra must ensure that all cooperative
1574 arrangements 45 CFR § 303.107 clearly describe each party's specific duties, functions,
1575 and responsibilities, with clear and definite standards of performance that meet Federal
1576 requirements. The parties must comply with Title IV-D of the Act, implementing Federal
1577 regulations. The parties must comply with applicable Federal laws and conditions for the
1578 financial arrangements, including budget estimates, covered expenditures, methods of
1579 determining costs, procedures for billing the IV-D agency, and any appropriate Federal and
1580 State reimbursements. 45 CFR § 303.107 establishes liability for failure to follow the
1581 federal statutes of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act by 45 CFR § 302.34 contractors.
1582 The State agency and its contractor exceed their official capacity to exercise the "Taking
1583 or Omission" of Blessett's contract rights as a property protected under the 5th amendment

⁷⁸ **Marbury v. Madison (1803)** was the first case in which the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a law passed by Congress. Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion for the Court articulated and defended the theory of judicial review, which holds that courts have the power to strike down legislation that violates the Constitution. Though judges rarely used this power before the U.S. Civil War (1861–65), it increasingly framed an important element of the judiciary's role in interpreting the Constitution. In part because of this, and in part because the facts of the case implicated a political struggle between the nation's leading political figures, many scholars identify Marbury as one of Supreme Court's most important decisions. <https://www.fjc.gov/history/cases/cases-that-shaped-the-federal-courts/marbury-v-madison> (Federal Judicial Center)

1584 without just compensation.⁷⁹ Gregg Abbott, Ken Paxton, Steven C McCall, Xavier Becerra,
1585 and Anthony Blinkin provide no compensation for removing or extinguishing his July 23,
1586 1999, Final Divorce Decree to enforce Title IV-D penalties.

1587 All acts outside of legal, contractual obligation, or judicial authority constitute
1588 misconduct that disregards fairness and due process requirements. Therefore, neglecting or
1589 ignoring Title IV Federal Statutes and the Procedural Law protections before a civil action
1590 is respectfully considered nonjudicial litigation-related conduct. Moreover, it is a direct
1591 conflict with the separation of powers. Accordingly, the Separations of Power the
1592 Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, or any person, or collection of persons, being of one
1593 of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others.

1594 The Federal Government and the State Title IV-D agencies create a monopoly in Family
1595 law to force out private domestic relation divorce contracts to favor the more lucrative Title
1596 IV federal benefits at the taxpayers' expense. The people entering support orders under a
1597 state judicial branch contract have the right to exclude Title IV-D enforcement from the
1598 contract, operating independently of the federal debt collection program. Under
1599 Federalism, the government executive agency's deprivation of the people of choices is
1600 outlawed under the circumstances outlined in the **Sherman Act**⁸⁰ for monopolies of

⁷⁹ 5th Amendment, Types of Takings, Many types of government action infringe on private property rights. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement is not limited to government seizures of real property. Instead, it extends to all kinds of tangible and intangible property, including but not limited to easements, personal property, contract rights, and trade secrets. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/takings> (Legal Information Institute)

⁸⁰ The Sherman Act outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade," and any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize." Long ago, the Supreme Court decided that the Sherman Act does not prohibit every restraint of trade, only those that are unreasonable. For instance, in some sense, an agreement between two individuals to form a partnership restrains trade, but may not do so unreasonably, and thus may be lawful under the antitrust laws. On the other hand, certain acts are considered so harmful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These include plain arrangements among competing individuals or businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids. These acts are "per

1601 services through a combination of active contractors and attorneys associated with the
1602 American Bar Association⁸¹. It is a symbiotic relationship between the American Bar
1603 Association and the Title IV-D agency's enforcement. It is a financial win for both attorneys
1604 handling divorce cases with children from the marriage.

1605 Title IV-D of the Social Security Act under Cooperative Federalism has created a
1606 monopoly in family law for interstate child support debt collection and enforcement as a
1607 government corporation, with satellite franchises under a 5 U.S.C. 101 executive agency.
1608 As a result, the U.S. Government and its contracted Title IV-D agencies have monopolized
1609 domestic relation commercial contracts for child support.

1610 Blessett has perfected a Prima Facia case by applying an administrative process against
1611 the Defendants. Blessett brought a section §1983 action against Defendants who injured
1612 him. Although the Defendants acted under the color federal and state law "cloaked in some
1613 degree of authority," the defendants "conspired or acted with concert efforts to deprive

se" violations of the Sherman Act; in other words, no defense or justification is allowed.
<https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws>
(Federal Trade Commission)

⁸¹ The first Federal child support enforcement legislation was Public Law 81–734, the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, which added section 402(a)(11) to the Social Security Act (42 USC 602(a)(11)). The legislation required State welfare agencies to notify appropriate law enforcement officials upon providing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to a child who was abandoned or deserted by a parent. Also, that year, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Association approved the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA; subsequent amendments to this act were approved in 1952, 1958, and 1968),

https://greenbookwaysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/2011/documents/CSE_Legislative%20History.pdf (Chapter8 –Child Support Enforcement), Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.—In order to satisfy (42 U.S.C. § 654(20)(A)), on and after January 1, 1998, each state must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar Association on February 9, 1993, together with any amendments officially adopted before January 1, 1998, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.<https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e12481bd-ac36-07ba-7d64-7841e9db5e09&forceDialog=0> (UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT)

1614 private uniform commercial rights for his interstate contract." In *United States v.*
1615 *Bongiorno*, 106 F.3d 1027, 1032 (1st Cir. 1997), it was held that "state-
1616 court-imposed child support orders are 'functionally equivalent to interstate
1617 contracts,'" rejecting the idea that child support payment obligations are
1618 somehow a "different" kind of debt.

1619 Mr. Phillip Gerard Emerson, lead counsel for the OAG, stated in **Civil Case Blessett**
1620 **v. Texas Office of the Attorney General Galveston County Child Support**
1621 **Enforcement Division, 3:17-cv-00164, TXSD, 2018**: *The Texas Attorney General was*
1622 *not a party and did not participate in the mediated settlement or the Agreed Decree of*
1623 *Divorce. The Agreed Decree of Divorce is itself [an]sic adjudication of paternity by the*
1624 *court. See Tx. Fam. Code 160.637 (a) (2). Sec. 160.637. BINDING EFFECT OF*
1625 *DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE. (a) Except as otherwise provided by Subsection*
1626 *(b) or Section 160.316, a determination of parentage is binding on: (2) all parties to an*
1627 *adjudication by a court acting under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional*
1628 *requirements of Section 159.201. Sec. 105.006. CONTENTS OF FINAL ORDER. (g)*
1629 *The Title IV-D agency shall promulgate and provide forms for a party to use in reporting*
1630 *to the court and the state case registry under Chapter 234, the information required under*
1631 *this section. Texas Family Code 160.637 (a) (2) does not establish paternity or satisfy due*
1632 *process for the sake of Title IV-D agency without satisfying 42 U.S.C. §666(c) performed*
1633 *by a Title IV-D agent or contractor providing the alternative legal consequences verbally*
1634 *or in writing. Where are these forms? Where is the evidence of informed consent? Where*
1635 *is the evidence of an agreement between Blessett and the state? A conclusive*
1636 *presumption must be accepted based on the facts presented in applying logical deduction.*

1637 Blessett has the right to enjoy his Divorce Decree, a private contract as it is written
1638 without government infringement under **Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United**
1639 **States Constitution**. Blessett has 5th amendment rights to his property and 14th amendment
1640 privileges uninterrupted through Title IV-D federal program enforcement without a valid

1641 legal instrument of authority. Blessett has 14th amendment rights to "Procedural Law
1642 Process" before state actors can infringe and seize property and privileges. Therefore,
1643 Blessett has the enumerated right of the 9th Amendment to enjoy his Final Divorce Decree.
1644 *Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis*, 301 U.S. 337, 353, 57 S.Ct. 816, 81 L.Ed. 1143 (1937)
1645 *"Constitutional questions are not to be decided hypothetically. When particular facts*
1646 *control the decision, they must be shown."* Blessett has to consent to the alternative legal
1647 consequences of Title IV-D for due process to be served. *It is not enough, as Blessing v.*
1648 *Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), *might have suggested, to show simply that a plaintiff "falls*
1649 *within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect."* *Gonzaga*, 536
1650 *U.S. at 283. It is now settled that nothing "short of an unambiguously conferred right" will*
1651 *support a cause of action under § 1983.* The United States must show that Title IV-D of
1652 the Social Security Act was intended to protect and benefit the noncustodial parent for the
1653 Act to be valid.

1654 The Texas Constitution and U.S. Constitution supremacy clause prohibits acting in one
1655 branch and acting on behalf of another branch. *Notwithstanding the limited application of*
1656 *federal law in the field of domestic relations generally, see McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.*
1657 *S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979); In re Burrus,*
1658 *136 U. S. 586, 593-594 (1890), the U.S. Supreme Court, even in this area, has not hesitated*
1659 *to protect, under the Supremacy Clause, rights and expectancies established by federal law*
1660 *against the operation of state law, or to prevent the frustration and erosion of the*
1661 *congressional policy embodied in the federal rights. See McCarty v. McCarty, supra;*
1662 *Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, supra; Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663 (1962); Wissner v.*
1663 *Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382 (1905). Cf. Yiatchos v.*
1664 *Yiatchos, 376 U. S. 306, 309 (1964). While "[s]tate family and family-property law must*
1665 *do `major damage' to `clear and substantial federal interests before the Supremacy Clause*
1666 *will demand that state law be overridden," Hisquierdo, 439 U. S., at 581, with references*
1667 *to United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 352 (1966), "[t]he relative importance to the*
1668 *State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the*

1669 *Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail." **Free v. Bland,***
1670 **369 U. S., at 666. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210-211 (1824).** *And,*
1671 *specifically, a state divorce decree, like other laws governing the economic aspects of*
1672 *domestic relations, must give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments. **McCarty v.***
1673 **McCarty, supra; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, supra.** That principle is the necessary
1674 consequence of the Supremacy Clause of our National Constitution. This civil action
1675 challenges the state's application of Title IV-D penalties to infringe and deprive the child
1676 support debtors' rights without consent.

1677 U.S. Congress federal statutes of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act set up Title IV-
1678 D administration to conflict with the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause and Separation
1679 of Powers. However, if the state OAG is the Title IV-D federal administrator⁸² and the top
1680 state executive law enforcement officer are concealed or cloaked authorities, no informed
1681 consent can be provided to the noncustodial parents. The state actors cannot serve two
1682 masters or be protected by two masters without violating the Supremacy Clauses and
1683 Separation of Power. This contradiction in public policy renders state programs set up as
1684 illegal, in direct violation of the United States Constitution. All state actors act under the
1685 law outside of their official capacity to simultaneously active agents for the federal program
1686 with state duties. **See Williams v. US, 396 F. 3d 412 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia**
1687 **Circuit 2005**

⁸² **Texas Constitution Art 4 Section 22 - ATTORNEY GENERAL**

The Attorney General shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law. **(Amended Nov. 3, 1936, Nov. 2, 1954, Nov. 7, 1972, and Nov. 2, 1999.)**

1688 Under 45 CFR § 303.20, the state organizational structure of the IV-D agency provides
1689 for administration or supervision of all the functions for which it is responsible under the
1690 State plan, with appropriate size and scope of the program in the State and *contains clearly*
1691 *established lines for the administrative and supervisory authority.* Therefore, under the
1692 Title IV-D contract terms, there must be a defined line for the program's administrative and
1693 supervisory authority. In addition, *article, I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States*
1694 *Constitution, known as the Contract Clause, imposes certain prohibitions on the states.*
1695 *These prohibitions are meant to protect individuals from intrusion by state governments.*
1696 *The state government is the intruder charged with the power to enforce public law*
1697 *restrictions on the state government intrusion.*

1698 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary) Texas 42 U.S.C. §
1699 654(3) contractor OAG used enforcement action outside of the compliance required under
1700 the federal statutes promulgated under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. For the OAG
1701 to meet the obligations of Title IV-D enforcement, collections, and distribution of
1702 commercial paper payment transactions, it must comply with 42 U.S.C. 654 contractual
1703 agreed terms. The OAG must follow contractual obligations of 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) and 42
1704 U.S. Code § 603(a)(5)(C)(iii)(III) *of their contract to escape liability for the damages*
1705 *against Blessett. It is not an intrusion on the contractor's rights for damages incurred for*
1706 *noncompliance with the federal program contract's federal obligation. Quoting Bell v.*
1707 *New Jersey, The participating states are subject to spending clause penalties and the public*
1708 *law liabilities and remedies for protected private individual rights. Just as the Supreme*
1709 *Court repeatedly has held that administrative enforcement schemes must be presumed to*
1710 *parallel the private § 1983 enforcement remedy rather than "occupy the same ground" as*
1711 *the State contends. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, 25 L.Ed.2d*
1712 *442 (1970)*

1713 Blessett Final Divorce Decree as a state court judicial order is an equitable instrument
1714 that creates a conclusive presumption. A Texas state court judicial modification is required

1715 before enforcing the Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Blessett's "Final Divorce
1716 Decree" *establishes paternity with a private contractual agreement for support and with a*
1717 *contract clause under a judicial order.* Thus, the terms under 42 U.S.C. § 654 (12) are
1718 obligations to Blessett, and 42 U.S.C. § 654 (13) provide that the State complies with such
1719 other requirements and standards as the U.S. Congress wrote necessary for the
1720 establishment of an effective program for obtaining support orders without conflicting with
1721 the U.S. Constitution.

1722 Title IV-D contracted services are nationwide debt collection and enforcement agencies
1723 for interstate contracts under "*Cooperative Federalism*," individual Federal-State
1724 Compacts. U.S. Congress enacted the **Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity**
1725 **Reconciliation Act of 1996** (PRWORA), **Uniform Interstate Family Support Act**
1726 (UIFSA), and **Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act** (FFCCSOA) as
1727 contractual legal instruments to remove foreign territories' sovereignty and jurisdiction
1728 restrictions. However, U.S. Congress cannot remove individual immunities, personal
1729 liberties, and freedoms from the people to enact any laws or constitutional amendments.
1730 Therefore, the State Title IV-D agencies must follow the contractual obligations *of their*
1731 *Title IV-D contract to escape liability for § 1983 civil damages and spending clause*
1732 *penalties enforced by the federal executive agency.*

1733 Under FFCCSOA, PRWORA and UIFSA contractually agreed on terms of the
1734 Congressional Acts that become minimum contact for jurisdiction, and 10th amendment
1735 protection to conduct interstate commercial business to meet the obligations of the United
1736 States government Title IV-D contract. **Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790-91(1983)**
1737 *("The Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of*
1738 *federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on*
1739 *their sovereignty. The State chose to participate in the Title I program and, as a condition*
1740 *of receiving the grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by the conditions of*
1741 *Title I... [T]he State failed to fulfill those assurances. It therefore became liable for the*

1742 *funds misused, as the grant specified.*"). Without the United States intervention, the states
1743 are restricted by personam jurisdiction and sister states' sovereign rights. Therefore, they
1744 would only be state child support programs and not federal, failing to meet the obligation
1745 of a nationwide United States contract as U.S. Congress intended.

1746 The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions
1747 involving the United States' rights arising under nationwide federal programs. Title IV-A
1748 and IV-D of The Social Security Act are unquestionably performing business functions
1749 within the meaning of the *Clearfield Trust Law Doctrine*. Since the agencies derive their
1750 authority to effectuate loan transactions for 42 U.S.C. § 604 "qualified first-time
1751 homebuyer, "postsecondary educational expenses paid "business capitalization, and under
1752 42 U.S.C § 654 (32) of the Title IV-D provide services for "foreign reciprocating country,
1753 a foreign treaty country, or a foreign country" described in 42 U.S.C. § 659a(d) for
1754 "International support enforcement" are contractual specific Acts of Congress passed in the
1755 exercise of a "constitutional function or power." Under Title IV-A and IV-D, the state rights
1756 are derived from a federal contract with the U.S. Government activities that arise from and
1757 rely heavily upon federal contract protections from liability, the U.S. Constitution
1758 restrictions to protect the people, and Acts of Congress to conduct contracted commercial
1759 interstate business. In *Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States*, it must be presumed that
1760 Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world. Although the
1761 agency is endowed with the authority to `sue or be sued,' that agency is not less amenable
1762 to judicial process than a private enterprise under similar circumstances. This suit clearly
1763 shows that the Texas Title IV-D agency is not consistent with the statutory or constitutional
1764 scheme, with implied restriction of the general authority necessary to avoid grave
1765 interference with a governmental function's performance. Prima facia evidence proves that
1766 the OAG and its contractors are nothing more than a corporation that offers and sells IV-D
1767 services to customers. In *Clearfield Trust vs. United States*, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943), the
1768 U.S. Supreme Court stated that "governments descend to the level a mere private
1769 corporation and takes all the character of a mere private citizen where private commercial

1770 paper, notes & securities are concerned, for purposes of the suit such corporations and
1771 individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from the government. Prima facie
1772 evidence proves active collaboration⁸³ between Congress and Texas under 31 U.S.C.
1773 §6305(1) ex contractu for profit by fraudulently inducing the nonprimary parent to accept
1774 an adhesion contract to perform or suffer the purposely concealed legal consequences.

1775 The Contracts Clause established in the Constitution allows for contracts, like taxes, to
1776 be commercial certainties on which the people rely to provide equal parameters for every
1777 citizen to follow. Under Cooperative Federalism, all Title IV-D agencies generate income
1778 like a private business from a federal government contract receiving money
1779 reimbursements for services rendered and financial incentives for performance under 42
1780 U.S.C. § 658a. The agencies operate under contract in the enforcement and collection of
1781 private debts. These businesses operate in a capitalist economy like privately owned
1782 businesses that offer goods and services in exchange for goods, services, or money.⁸⁴
1783 Federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 658a. is a coercive financial inducement on the states for
1784 collection performance, the child support debt collection totals determine the performance.
1785 Thus, the state agencies are incentivized. Title IV-D Incentives for collection performance

⁸³ Collusion: an agreement between two or more “persons” to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. **Black’s Law Rev. 4th Ed. Pg. 331.**

⁸⁴ First, the Court has required that the federal government make its conditions clear at the time the states accept the grants. **Arlington Central School District v. Murphy (2006)** Second, the Court said that a condition might be unconstitutional if it was too loosely related to the purpose of the grant to which it was attached. But a grant’s purpose can typically be described broadly enough to ensure that the relatedness doctrine imposes few meaningful limitations. In **South Dakota v. Dole**, for example, the Court upheld a law conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on states’ raising their drinking ages to 21, because both the funding and the condition promoted “safe interstate travel.” Third, the Court indicated that Congress’s “financial inducement” might sometimes be unconstitutionally “coercive.” But the Court never actually ruled that a condition coerced the states until its 2012 decision addressing the Affordable Care Act (ACA), **NFIB v. Sebelius**. One provision of the ACA required states that participated in Medicaid to expand their Medicaid programs to all adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level. In a ruling endorsed by seven of nine justices, the Court held that the threatened loss of all Medicaid funds to states that refused to expand their programs rendered the offer unconstitutionally coercive. Chief Justice Roberts’s pivotal opinion pointed to the extremely large amount of money was at stake, making the threat a “gun to the head” of states.

1786 are inducements and cash bounties on Child support debtors under administrative law
1787 affecting collection enforcement. Congress intended to induce the State collection agencies
1788 to increase performance without considering possibly violations of constitutional
1789 prohibitions without oversight. Under the contractual Spending Clause, Blessett charges
1790 Title IV-D's Incentive performance requirements to incentivize deceptive, aggressive,
1791 coercive, and predatory violations through Title IV-D's funding conditions. Title IV-D's
1792 incentive for performance as a condition to receive federal grants is illegitimate, unrelated,
1793 and counterproductive to the national interest. Incentives for collection performance do not
1794 reduce payments made to support the Title IV-A or IV-D programs. Instead, it is rerouting
1795 funds to Title IV-D to create a more returning customer base and more single-parent Title
1796 IV-A recipients. The federal government subsidizes the State's employee payroll at the
1797 people's expense and increases the State's income, just like any business.

1798 For the reasons listed in the previous paragraph, Blessett has raised the issue of the
1799 **Clearfield Trust Doctrine** against the State contracted Title IV-D agencies. The Title IV-
1800 D programs are federal contracts with income streams, with penalties for noncompliance
1801 of contractual requirements as a fictional corporate entity. The state Title IV-D agencies
1802 operate under a "Federal-State Compact" "Cooperative Federalism" conveniently
1803 packaged by Congress as the PRWORA and the UIFSA following general contract law
1804 principles. These state Title IV-D programs are money-making federal to state, business
1805 to business enterprises and should be treated as independent entities, as separate companies
1806 generating income. All Title IV-D agencies generate income servicing interstate contracts
1807 under a federal contract as a business. Title IV-D is a nationwide United States Government
1808 program that has substantial federal involvement in the services it provides. Congress
1809 federal control maintains uniform commercial paper in state payment distribution centers
1810 for interstate commerce with sister states, Title IV-A loans, foreign collections, and
1811 Electronic Funds Transfer security.

1812 U.S. Congress created a contractual right under 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) to receive
1813 documents or valid legal instruments for services. Federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 603
1814 (5)(c)(iii)(III) required the Title IV-D agency to properly enroll individuals into the
1815 program to produce the documentation necessary for 42 U.S.C. § 654(12). The federal
1816 statute, 42 U.S.C. § 654(12), assures the "Procedural Law Process to protect child support
1817 debtor's 5th and 14th amendment rights. The Supreme Court set forth three factors to assess
1818 whether a statute provides enforceable rights that may be pursued through §1983:

1819(1) *U.S. Congress intended the Plaintiff as the beneficiary of the statute, (2) the statute imposes*
1820 *a binding obligation on the State, and (3) is the asserted a right not so "vague and*
1821 *amorphous" its enforcement would strain judicial competence. **Quoting Blessing v***
1822 **Freestone 520 US 329 - Supreme Court 1997** U.S. Congress legislative requirements for
1823 Procedural Due Process in enforcing Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is an
1824 unquestionable duty under the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, there is no reason for not
1825 having the instruments the Plaintiff requested or documentation under 42 U.S.C. § 654(12).

1826 The contracted agency agreed to the terms of the contract and the liabilities for failure
1827 to meet the contract's federal provisions for private § 1983 enforcement remedy **Id. Rosado**
1828 **v. Wyman.** The Texas Title IV-D agency is the United States contracted debt collection
1829 and enforcement business with private law liabilities. These facts are reached through
1830 logical reasoning and the collection of evidentiary facts, as a legal conclusion is achieved
1831 by applying fixed laws.

1832 The First Amendment's language ("congress shall make no law") explicitly prohibits
1833 the government from infringing on liberties, natural rights inherent to each person. Civil
1834 liberties operate as restraints on how the government can treat the people. The material
1835 evidence and facts presented shift the burden of proof to the Defendants to refute Blessett's
1836 charges of applying the federal statutes Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The
1837 defendants have been unable to deliver legal instruments or documents (contract) of

1838 authority, and there has been no rebutting evidence; therefore, Blessett's unanswered
1839 charges are evidence of corruption and abuse of the system.

1840 In the 1997 Balanced Budget Act P.L. 105-33, Congress required Texas to
1841 implement procedures compelling the use of SSN pursuant to the Federal Child Support
1842 Enforcement Program Sec. 8 pg. 15, the SSN is the “key” piece of information around the
1843 child support information system. Computer searches “need” the SSN to operate
1844 effectively.

- 1845 • 45 CFR 302.70(a)(5)(iii)(D) **requires** that voluntary acknowledgment forms include lines
1846 for parents' social security numbers.
- 1847 • Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §666(a)(13), you are **required** to disclose Social Security
1848 numbers to the child support agency for the purposes of establishing paternity and
1849 establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations and other child support
1850 enforcement activities.
- 1851 • PRWORA, P.L. 104-193 of 1996; Each party is **required** to provide their social security
1852 number in accordance with Title IV-D program for child support enforcement.
- 1853 • Require: to direct, order, demand instruct, command, claim, “compel” request, need, exact.
1854 Black’s Law Rev. 4th Ed. Pg. 1469.

1855 The word “key” means an indefinite description of “property” made certain. **Black’s**
1856 **Law Rev. 4th Ed. Pg. 1008.** Referencing 20 CFR §422.103(d) that social security cards
1857 names and account numbers are the “property” of the SSA, and you “must” return it upon
1858 request. Therefore, the requirement of an SSN by the Texas agency is a felony pursuant to
1859 42 U.S.C. §408 Penalties(a)(8) In general; whoever compels the disclosure of the social
1860 security number of any person in violation of the laws of the United States; or conspires to
1861 commit an offense and shall be guilty of a felony.

1862 U.S. Congress knew they could not force people into a contract without knowledgeable
1863 consent. The state agencies knew no sane person would consent to the terms of the Title
1864 IV-D program. Therefore, the agencies deliberately omit the harsh penalties, provide no
1865 documentation, never inform the nonprimary parent that they may decline the program
1866 services or make them aware that the agencies operate under the executive branch. Most
1867 Title IV-D hearings are held in courtrooms, with judges serving as Title IV-D
1868 administrators. It is a deception perpetrated as a judicial proceeding.

1869 Congress created conditions that induce States to violate the constitutional rights
1870 against child support debtors and for the States to find ways to increase their revenue by
1871 deceptive aggressive enrollment for more child support debtors. Regular practice is the
1872 aggressive enrollment into the Title IV-D program at the time of the child's birth, which is
1873 deceptive when the parties are not fully informed about the full terms and implications for
1874 signing an acknowledgment of paternity. It is treated as automatic enrollment into this Title
1875 IV-D program as soon as the custodial parent assigns their right to the Title IV-D agency.
1876 It is a direct violation of the simple administrative procedure where the parties are not fully
1877 informed of their right to decline the offer.

1878 Furthermore, it is deceptive when administrative hearings have the appearance of a
1879 judicial setting when these issues are being portrayed to have legal force. Worst of all, it is
1880 the enforcement of executive orders without legal standing as ongoing proactive material
1881 deception of the law. U.S. Congress Title IV's incentive conditions on funding are
1882 impermissibly coercive, an effect of the Title IV conditions "solely from the standpoint of
1883 the incentive payments for performance." "Incident to this power, *Congress may attach*
1884 *conditions on the receipt of federal funds and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further*
1885 *broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the*
1886 *recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.'"* **South Dakota v. Dole, 483**
1887 **U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion**
1888 **of Burger, C.J.)**); see **New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992)**. Congress may
1889 not induce the States to violate constitutional rights as a condition of its spending clause.
1890 An incentive payment system for administrative law performance is a "bounty" on a
1891 "specific class of debtors" enacted by Congress. The harsh penalties are without
1892 comparison to any other debtors in the United States. Congress helped incentivize
1893 discriminatory behavior toward a specific class of debtors. Congress created specific
1894 penalties and rewards against a particular class with inducements to encourage
1895 administrative law enforcement without U.S. Constitutional protections under Title IV-D
1896 contracts. *The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may*

1897 *not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch*
1898 *137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Congress's power to legislate can never extend so far as to*
1899 *disavow restraints on federal power carefully constructed in the U.S. Constitution.*

1900 In 1998, Congress enacted the ***Child Support Performance and Incentive Act, Pub. L.***
1901 ***No. 105-200, 112 Stat. 645.*** It is responsible for inducing discriminatory behavior toward
1902 individuals with child support debt as if it were some special kinds of debt that deserve
1903 unequal treatment—the incentives under 42 U.S.C. 658a, by definition, is designed as an
1904 inducement to increase state collection and enrollment performance levels. Moreover,
1905 under 45 CFR § 305.40, penalty performance levels and 45 CFR § 305.61 penalties for
1906 failure to meet Title IV requirements are designed by nature to coerce or increase predatory
1907 enrollment and creative collection. This civil action shows the Court what can happen
1908 through performance inducements, a policy of negligence or incompetence, or corruption.
1909 Still, the fact shows noncompliance with the safeguards of the federal contract.

1910 With the contractual safeguard impossible to overlook, it is indeed an enforcement and
1911 collection contract with harsh penalties against a child support debtor without a written
1912 contract, with predatory marketing and recruitment for enrollment through deception and
1913 concealment of the loss of federal protections for the immature debtor. The U.S. Supreme
1914 Court *"have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants*
1915 *might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national*
1916 *projects or programs."* **South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)** The State is not
1917 selling a service or product that benefits the individual child support debtor. Administrative
1918 performances incentives promote corruption as it induces the States to cut corners to
1919 increase revenue. Incentives under 42 U.S.C. 658a neither financially benefits custodial
1920 parent nor offers any benefits to noncustodial parents. Federal statute 42 U.S.C. 658a is a
1921 bounty for performance to increase customers enrolled in the federal program.

1922 The time has come to revisit and challenge the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C § 658a of
1923 the Title IV-D of the Social Security Act as a repugnant cash bounty on ***Child Support***
1924 ***Debtors***. The program's ***Spending Clause*** enforcement tool 42 U.S.C § 658a incentivizes
1925 discrimination against ***Child Support Debtors*** as an implicit bias against Deadbeat parents.
1926 Equality is offered on the surface and denied by implicit bias of the deadbeat moniker
1927 established in the H.R. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 signed by Bill Clinton.
1928 Along with the Incentive rewards for performance, 42 U.S.C § 658a to the state agencies
1929 under administrative law on any account or definition is an inducement to create an illegal
1930 bounty to increase the number of noncustodial parents under the program by creative
1931 means. The Title IV-D program is not an entitlement program. It requires evidence of
1932 modifying a state court order or proof of their consent to the services. 42 U.S.C § 658a of
1933 the Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is a cash bounty that singles out ***Child Support***
1934 ***Debtors*** as a group for punishment as bills of attainder prohibited under Article I, Sections
1935 9 and 10. The Supreme Court has recognized four general limitations: *spending must be in*
1936 *pursuit of the general welfare; any attached conditions must be unambiguous; conditions*
1937 *must also be related to a federal interest; and the obligations imposed by Congress may*
1938 *not violate any independent constitutional provisions. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. The*
1939 *Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended these linkages between Title IV-D*
1940 *child support programs and the TANF program. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484*
1941 *(1990) (concluding Congress intended the two programs to "operate together closely to*
1942 *provide uniform levels of support for children of equal need")*

1943 The Secretary's failure to secure federal provisions of the Title IV-D program and by
1944 not upholding the responsibilities given by the U.S. Congress regarding the Title IV-D
1945 leads to:

1946 1. Denial of a parallel §1983 civil actions against the U.S. government program agents.
1947 That allows the 45 CFR 302.34 contractors aggressive behavior towards:

- 1948 a. To increase performance quotas for federal grant dollars,
- 1949 b. Promoting municipalities to increase Title IV-D customers to raise revenue to
- 1950 increase performance rewards and reimbursement payments for administrative services
- 1951 to those customers to subsidize their employee payrolls.

1952 2. They ignore the laws and invent creative taxes that damage and injure the child

1953 support debtor under the color of law.

1954 The current environment is as follows:

1955 a. Forced Title IV-D unilateral contract without due process, without knowledge of

1956 penalties, without proof of consent, without benefits or considerations for the *Child*

1957 *Support Debtors*.

1958 b. there is no tangible contract given.

1959 c. there is no repayment scheme for illegal paternity payments or security bonds on

1960 the Title IV-D agencies acting as creditors.

1961 d. there is no repayment scheme for overpayments made to the custodial parent

1962 security bonds on the Title IV-D agencies acting as creditors.

1963 e. there is no easy scheme for arbitration for reporting 45 CFR 304.34 contractors'

1964 violations or misconduct.

1965 f. the administrative suspension of driving license to deny the liberty to travel

1966 without due process.

1967 g. state creating taxes to capitalize on the federal statute of Title IV-D the Social
1968 Security Act.

1969 h. silence or non-activity defaults as consent or enrollment without proof of receipt
1970 of the notice is an abuse of due process and is illegal.

1971 We cannot ignore the public law restrictions for Title IV-D contractors and the child
1972 support debtor's protections in discharging the debts. But, unfortunately, the Secretary
1973 permits a cascade of problems when legal discretion is abused concerning Title IV of the
1974 Social Security Act.

1975 U.S. Congress did not provide federal provisions in the Title IV-D of the Social Security
1976 Act to return money to the child support debtor paid for paternity fraud or misdirected
1977 payments to the wrong party, or child support overpayments. Instead, the Secretary allows
1978 theft and abuse when inaction in enforcing the Act's spending clause penalties for
1979 noncompliance. Without adequate U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
1980 oversight to protect the federal funds, the agency is sanctioning the theft of U.S
1981 Government funds. It is no different than Medicare or Medicaid Fraud. The U.S.
1982 Department of Health of Human Services provides opportunities for abuse and promotes
1983 illegal activity through failed enforcement of the federal provisions. As a result, the U.S.
1984 Department of Health and Human Services' injurious behavior fails to protect the U.S
1985 government's interest.

1986 Federal statute 42 U.S.C § 658a is a clear inducement as a bounty on child support
1987 debtors and promotes welfare dependency by unwedded mothers rewarding their injurious
1988 behavior. Incentivizing state agencies to take creative liberties with heterosexual biological
1989 males' birthright and U.S. Constitution rights to abort the consequences of recreational sex
1990 in intimate private relations. Liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in

1991 deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters about sex. "[H]istory and tradition
1992 are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
1993 inquiry." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
1994 concurring). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 - Supreme Court 2003 "Our obligation is to
1995 define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." Planned Parenthood of
1996 Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 850 (1992). The federal government cannot
1997 mandate moral codes for adults in private sexual matters.⁸⁵

1998 The responsibility and consequences of recreational sex fall on the biological female
1999 right to prevent or abort the consequences under Roe V Wade independent of the biological
2000 heterosexual male. Without a written legal, contractual obligation, the biological
2001 heterosexual male has an inalienable right to abort all consequences of recreational sex.
2002 Forced *religious morality* must be removed from the legal determination for procreation
2003 and private intimate activities. Only the U.S. Constitution's restrictions on government and
2004 the law may be applied to ensure equality. Along with established doctrines under Roe v
2005 Wade and Obergefell v Hodges to assure Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
2006 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution for heterosexual
2007 biological males in intimate matters. Lawsuits have argued that the *Equal Protection*
2008 *Clause* of the constitution or federal laws prohibiting discrimination based on a disfavored
2009 group, like the child support debtors and straight males. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
2010 644 (2015), is a landmark civil rights case in the United States Supreme Court. It ruled that
2011 same-sex couples' fundamental right to marry is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and
2012 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
2013 Constitution. The 5–4 ruling requires all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
2014 Insular Areas to perform and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples on the same

⁸⁵ The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 - Supreme Court 2003.

2015 terms and conditions as the marriages of opposite-sex couples, with all the accompanying
2016 rights and responsibilities. The U.S. Supreme Court case of *Obergefell v. Hodges*
2017 consolidates six lower-court cases, initially standing for sixteen same-sex couples, seven
2018 of their children, a widower, an adoption agency, and a funeral director. Those cases came
2019 from Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. All six federal district court rulings were
2020 found for same-sex couples and other claimants. When any state intrudes into the realm of
2021 private marital, family, and intimate relations, the state effectively infringes on rights
2022 protected explicitly by the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Constitution. *Biological*
2023 *heterosexual males already have the natural biological birthright to abort the consequence*
2024 *of recreational sex. The Judicial system applying religious morality standards only on*
2025 *biological heterosexual males infringes on their privacy rights. It is **gender discrimination***
2026 *if religious morality standards are only used on straight males.*

2027 The U.S. Supreme Court favors the individual's due process 14th amendment and 1st
2028 amendment privacy rights. *Roe v Wade* and *Obergefell v Hodges* set up the judicial law
2029 doctrine for personal privacy rights that overturned public opinion of conformity and public
2030 religious belief for the individual's rights. We can no longer deny equal gender rights to
2031 biological heterosexual males. **See Reva B. Siegel, *She the People: The Nineteenth***
2032 ***Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 949***
2033 ***(2002)*** (*arguing that, in the constitutional context, "the Supreme Court developed the law*
2034 *of sex discrimination by means of an analogy between sex and race discrimination"*).
2035 *Accordingly, we find that Loving's insight— that policies that distinguish according to*
2036 *protected characteristics cannot be saved by equal application—extends to association*
2037 *based on sex. **See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010***
2038 ***(1967)***

2039 Biological females have a variety of choices in preventing the creation of children due
2040 to recreational sex. Science has devoted considerable time and energy to protecting a
2041 women's right to control her body and avoid the consequence of recreational sex. *Roe v*

2042 Wade provides additional legal protection as judicial made law and abortion as the ultimate
2043 removal of the consequence of recreational sex. Thus, biological women are allowed to
2044 avoid the consequence of a decision that they have total control over. With today's
2045 technology, judicial law, and U.S. Constitutional rights, a biological woman's decision to
2046 create a child alone is her protected personal decision. It is a biological woman's right to
2047 choose and accept all the consequences of recreational sex without infringement on her
2048 rights. Scientifically, the biological female is the gatekeeper to the procreation of a child
2049 with full knowledge of the consequence of unprotected recreational sex. Her body, her
2050 choice. It is a matter of equality between the genders. Although it is equality among the
2051 genders, LBGQT and biological females take full advantage of their privacy rights and
2052 discard the religious morality that prevents it. Biological heterosexual males are denied this
2053 right for religious morality, unlawful the color of law, family law attorneys, and deceptive
2054 practices from state Title IV-D programs

2055 As the Supreme Court has explained, *"if the constitutional conception of `equal*
2056 *protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare*
2057 *congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate*
2058 *governmental interest."* **U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S.Ct. 2821,**
2059 **37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); see also Bower v. Vill. of Mount Sterling, 44 Fed. Appx. 670,**
2060 **675-78 (6th Cir.2002)** (*denial of appointment to village police chief in retaliation for*
2061 *plaintiffs' parents' political views states Equal Protection claim*) In Loving, the
2062 Commonwealth of Virginia argued that anti-miscegenation statutes did not violate the
2063 Equal Protection Clause because such statutes applied equally to white and black citizens.
2064 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that *"equal application"* could not save the statute
2065 because it was based *"upon distinctions drawn according to race."* **Bostic v. Schaefer 760**
2066 **F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014)**. Constitutional cases like Loving *"can provide helpful guidance*
2067 *in statutory context"* for equality. Heterosexual males are not the gatekeepers to procreation
2068 or the consequences of biological female behavior.

2069 The "distinctions are drawn according to gender sex" and application of religious, moral
2070 standards between the sexes. "The heterosexual male is immune from all government
2071 infringement and procedure, absent contract." see, **Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19**
2072 **How.) 393** or as the Supreme Court has stated clearly, "...every man is independent of all
2073 laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his
2074 fellowmen without his consent." **In reality, there is a valid difference between**
2075 **recreational sex and procreational sex under a marriage contract between**
2076 **individuals.**

2077 *Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of sex-based discrimination is "sufficiently*
2078 *important government purpose" gender conformity is protected against sex discrimination*
2079 *in the 21st century. Glenn v. Brumby, No. 10-14833 (11th Cir. 2011)*

2080 The decision for the protected right to privacy without government infringement has
2081 been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court Law Doctrine and denied disproportionately by
2082 the U.S. judicial system applying religious morality for straight males. Biology gave
2083 heterosexual males their birthright to be free of all consequences of recreational sex. The
2084 U.S. Congress or any government body may not create legal infringement on natural rights.

2085 The U.S. Constitution restrictions must guide the judicial branch's decision, and the
2086 rights granted to free heterosexual males, not under contracts, are evident in the U.S.
2087 Constitution. The biological heterosexual male's right to abort the consequences of
2088 recreational sex without a contract is a fundamental right protected by both the Due Process
2089 Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

2090 Judeo-Christian morality and personal religious beliefs are protected rights. They were
2091 the major obstacles for the LBGTQ community and a woman's right to abort a pregnancy,
2092 the consequences of recreational sex. *In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain*

2093 *basic questions. What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a*
2094 *"tradition of disfavor" by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the*
2095 *law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate*
2096 *treatment? In most cases, the answer to these questions will tell us whether the statute has*
2097 *a "rational basis." The answers will result in the virtually automatic invalidation of racial*
2098 *classifications and in the validation of most economic classifications, but they will provide*
2099 *differing results in cases involving classifications based on alienage, gender, or*
2100 *illegitimacy. **Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 US 432 - Supreme Court***
2101 **1985** *The twenty-first century Law Doctrines and legislation have provided a legal path for*
2102 *multi-gender equality beyond male-female classifications. It is time to enforce gender-*
2103 *equal protected rights for biological heterosexual males' sexual consequences in*
2104 *noncontractual intimacy.*

2105 It is factual that any law passed by U.S. Congress or State government that goes against
2106 the U.S. Constitution is invalid and unenforceable law. It is why the U.S. Supreme Court
2107 had to rule in favor of Roe v Wade and Obergefell v Hodges. The truth is that there are
2108 not any public laws to prevent biological heterosexual males from exercising their
2109 birthrights and U.S. Constitution protection to abort the consequences of recreational sex
2110 without a contract.

2111 *It appears the idea has prevailed that we have in this county two national governments;*
2112 *one maintained under the Constitution, with all of its restrictions, and another maintained*
2113 *by U.S. Congress outside and independent of the U.S. Constitution by exercising such*
2114 *powers of other nations on this earth with elite aristocratic governments. This civil action*
2115 *represents that evil day in American Liberty, and the government is outside the Supreme*
2116 *Law of the Land and our U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence. No higher duty rest on a U.S.*
2117 *court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the*
2118 *Constitution. **Quoting Supreme Court Justice John Harlan in the Case of Downes v.***
2119 **Bidwell.**

2120 In closing, we ask the court to accept that the Doctrine of Tacit admissions is firmly
2121 entrenched in state and federal criminal prosecutions. This is because courts have assumed
2122 that a reasonable juror could find a person more likely to deny an accusation he knows to
2123 be false than one he knows to be true⁸⁶.

⁸⁶ "[I]t is the nature of innocence to be impatient of a charge of guilt and an innocent person will usually spontaneously deny the accusation ... " People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 94, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924) (alternative holding). The idea is captured in the Latin phrase *qui tacet consentire videtur*, "the silence of a party implies his consent" See **BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (4th ed. 1951)**. However, the following cliches suggest other reasons for silence: "wise men say nothing in dangerous times," Seldon, *Wisdom*, in TABLE TALK 194 (Reynolds ed. 1892), quoted in Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 429, 32 A.2d 889, 894 (1943) (Maxey, C.J., dissenting) ; "silence never betrays you," O'Reilly, Rules of the Road, in ROCHE, LIFE OF JOHN BOYLE O'REILLY 532-33 (1891), quoted in State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 257-58, 130 A.2d 80, 84 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 548, 133 A.2d 395 (1957) ; "silence never shows itself to so great an advantage as when it is made in reply to calumny and defamation," ADDISON, The Tatler No. 133, in 4 WORK'S OF JOSEPH ADDISON 144 (Greene ed. 1880), quoted in State v. Kobylarz, supra at 258, 130 A.2d at 84. Compare the Danish proverb, "The words of a silent man are never brought to court," quoted in MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1098 (1st ed. 1942). Other cliches are quoted in Commonwealth v. Vallone, supra at 429, 32 A.2d at 894 (Maxey, C.J., dissenting). The risks of basing a rule of evidence on a "catchy cliché" have been eloquently criticized. *Ibid*.

It has been suggested that the question is whether a normal guilty person is less likely to deny an accusation than a normal innocent person. Note, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 128, 130 (1947). But guilty persons may be as likely (or more likely) to deny an injurious statement that is true as one that is false. See State v. Munston, 35 La. Ann. 888 (1883); Note, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 128, 131 (1947). "History is replete with instances of denial of accusations by the guilty." People v. Todaro, 256 Mich. 427, 435, 240 N.W. 90, 93 (1932) (dissenting opinion). The evidence is pertinent only if this particular defendant's failure to deny raises a permissible inference of guilt; ultimately that judgment must be based, however, on a view of the way a normal person reacts. Commonwealth v. Vallone, supra; see Note, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 128, 130 (1947). **TACIT CRIMINAL ADMISSIONS**
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6481&context=penn_law_review#:~:text=The%20%20doctrine%20%20of%20%20tacit%20,%20to%20one%20theory%2C%20%20a%20failure%20to

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Certified Pleading Affidavit

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I, Joe Blessett, have drafted, read, understood, declare and certify the attached forgoing

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for a **Complaint and Injunction for Declaratory Judgment** filed herein as the truth. Each

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fact alleged therein is true and correct of my knowledge under penalty of perjury. A copy

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of the Complaint and Injunction for Declaratory Judgment will be served as per Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 4.


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FURTHER, THE AFFIANT SAYIT NAUGHT

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Joe Blessett

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SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED

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BEFORE THIS 4th DAY OF January 2022

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
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NOTARY PUBLIC

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My commission expires: 07/17/2023

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CONCLUSION

2125 Plaintiff prays the courts and jury grant favorable for Joe Blessett, correcting the U.S.
2126 Constitution conflict and the Plaintiff's remedies requested under the cause of actions in
2127 this Certified Document. Additionally, Plaintiff requests that this certified document be
2128 used to setoff and eliminate the alleged Texas Attorney General Child Support
2129 Enforcement Division debt against JOSEPH CRAIG BLESSETT.

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Joe Blessett

Pro Se

2133

7970 Fredericksburg Rd. STE. 101-708

2134

San Antonio, Texas 78229

2135

joe@joblessett.com

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Ph.281-667-1174

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Jan 6, 2022
Date